Can we trust our memories? C. I. Lewiss coherence argument
(2004) In Synthese 142(1). p.21-41- Abstract
- In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis’s view on the role of coherence – what
he calls “congruence” – in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis
has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent
items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has
some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of
independently obtained items of evidence – such as converging memories or testimonies
– raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification,
or, to use Lewis’s expression, “rational and practical reliance”.... (More) - In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis’s view on the role of coherence – what
he calls “congruence” – in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis
has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent
items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has
some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of
independently obtained items of evidence – such as converging memories or testimonies
– raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification,
or, to use Lewis’s expression, “rational and practical reliance”. It turns out that, while
the negative thesis is essentially correct (apart from a slight flaw in Lewis’s account of
independence), a strong positive connection between congruence and probability – a connection
of the kind Lewis ultimately needs in his validation of memory – is contingent on
the Principle of Indifference. In the final section we assess the repercussions of the latter
fact for Lewis’s theory in particular and for coherence justification in general. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/144297
- author
- Olsson, Erik J LU and Shogenji, T.
- organization
- publishing date
- 2004
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Lewis coherence congruence
- in
- Synthese
- volume
- 142
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 21 - 41
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000225023200002
- scopus:33751181866
- ISSN
- 0039-7857
- DOI
- 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000047708.33913.2b
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 80db878a-6500-44c6-8803-14e54d333910 (old id 144297)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 15:43:46
- date last changed
- 2022-03-22 05:55:24
@article{80db878a-6500-44c6-8803-14e54d333910,
abstract = {{In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis’s view on the role of coherence – what<br/><br>
he calls “congruence” – in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis<br/><br>
has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent<br/><br>
items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has<br/><br>
some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of<br/><br>
independently obtained items of evidence – such as converging memories or testimonies<br/><br>
– raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification,<br/><br>
or, to use Lewis’s expression, “rational and practical reliance”. It turns out that, while<br/><br>
the negative thesis is essentially correct (apart from a slight flaw in Lewis’s account of<br/><br>
independence), a strong positive connection between congruence and probability – a connection<br/><br>
of the kind Lewis ultimately needs in his validation of memory – is contingent on<br/><br>
the Principle of Indifference. In the final section we assess the repercussions of the latter<br/><br>
fact for Lewis’s theory in particular and for coherence justification in general.}},
author = {{Olsson, Erik J and Shogenji, T.}},
issn = {{0039-7857}},
keywords = {{Lewis
coherence
congruence}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{21--41}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Synthese}},
title = {{Can we trust our memories? C. I. Lewiss coherence argument}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000047708.33913.2b}},
doi = {{10.1023/B:SYNT.0000047708.33913.2b}},
volume = {{142}},
year = {{2004}},
}