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In Defence of the Open Question Argument

Strandberg, Caj LU (2004) In Journal of Ethics 8(2). p.179-196
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
analytic reductionism, G. E. Moore, moral properties, naturalism, naturalistic fallacy, open question argument, paradox of analysis
in
Journal of Ethics
volume
8
issue
2
pages
179 - 196
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:77950085101
ISSN
1382-4554
DOI
10.1023/B:JOET.0000018766.62114.75
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
d40122f7-4a1a-42d0-b44f-0d8df9757607 (old id 144338)
date added to LUP
2007-07-27 09:27:36
date last changed
2017-10-08 04:27:21
@article{d40122f7-4a1a-42d0-b44f-0d8df9757607,
  abstract     = {The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken.},
  author       = {Strandberg, Caj},
  issn         = {1382-4554},
  keyword      = {analytic reductionism,G. E. Moore,moral properties,naturalism,naturalistic fallacy,open question argument,paradox of analysis},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {179--196},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Journal of Ethics},
  title        = {In Defence of the Open Question Argument},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:JOET.0000018766.62114.75},
  volume       = {8},
  year         = {2004},
}