Can I be an instantaneous stage and yet persist through time?
(2008) In Metaphysica 9(2). p.235-239- Abstract
- An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive... (More)
- An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503754
- author
- Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2008
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Persistence - Stage theory - Temporal counterparts - Predication - Leibniz’s Law
- in
- Metaphysica
- volume
- 9
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 235 - 239
- publisher
- Springer
- ISSN
- 1437-2053
- DOI
- 10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 8c66fe3c-e2a0-4ff6-b1c4-d8ce6490f42a (old id 1503754)
- alternative location
- http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 11:26:53
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 21:04:55
@article{8c66fe3c-e2a0-4ff6-b1c4-d8ce6490f42a, abstract = {{An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts.}}, author = {{Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias}}, issn = {{1437-2053}}, keywords = {{Persistence - Stage theory - Temporal counterparts - Predication - Leibniz’s Law}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{235--239}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Metaphysica}}, title = {{Can I be an instantaneous stage and yet persist through time?}}, url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/5775910/8673773.pdf}}, doi = {{10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{2008}}, }