Locke and the Non-arbitrary
(2003) In European Journal of Political Theory 2(3). p.261-279- Abstract
- In this article, John Locke's accounts of political liberty and legitimate government are read as expressions of a normative demand for non-arbitrariness. I argue that Locke locates infringements of political liberty in dependence on the arbitrary will of another, whether or not interference or restraint actually takes place. This way Locke is tentatively placed in that tradition of republican thought recently brought to our attention by Pettit, Skinner and others. This reading shifts the focus on legitimacy and identifies the independent moral argument for legitimate government as ruling for the good of the people. Consent is left with a hypothetical role to play.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/155329
- author
- Halldenius, Lena LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2003
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- dependence, government, hypothetical consent, legitimacy, liberty, Locke, non-arbitrariness, public good, republicanism, trust
- in
- European Journal of Political Theory
- volume
- 2
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 261 - 279
- publisher
- SAGE Publications
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:34248059574
- ISSN
- 1741-2730
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 2bbfcdcb-b2e5-46f4-92b0-b3e2c8bd5486 (old id 155329)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 12:35:02
- date last changed
- 2022-04-21 17:27:51
@article{2bbfcdcb-b2e5-46f4-92b0-b3e2c8bd5486,
abstract = {{In this article, John Locke's accounts of political liberty and legitimate government are read as expressions of a normative demand for non-arbitrariness. I argue that Locke locates infringements of political liberty in dependence on the arbitrary will of another, whether or not interference or restraint actually takes place. This way Locke is tentatively placed in that tradition of republican thought recently brought to our attention by Pettit, Skinner and others. This reading shifts the focus on legitimacy and identifies the independent moral argument for legitimate government as ruling for the good of the people. Consent is left with a hypothetical role to play.}},
author = {{Halldenius, Lena}},
issn = {{1741-2730}},
keywords = {{dependence; government; hypothetical consent; legitimacy; liberty; Locke; non-arbitrariness; public good; republicanism; trust}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{261--279}},
publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
series = {{European Journal of Political Theory}},
title = {{Locke and the Non-arbitrary}},
volume = {{2}},
year = {{2003}},
}