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Equality and Comparative Justice

Alm, David LU (2010) In Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53(4). p.309-325
Abstract (Swedish)
Abstract in Undetermined

In this paper I criticize the standard argument for deontological egalitarianism, understood as the thesis that there is a moral claim to have an equal share of well-being or whatever other good counts. That argument is based on the idea that equals should be treated equally. I connect the debate over egalitarianism with that over comparative justice. A common theme is a general skepticism against comparative claims. I argue (i) that there can be no claim to equality based simply on the fact of equal worth as that fact itself does not have any value for the supposed claim holder; and (ii) intuitions that suggest otherwise can be explained away without appealing to comparative claims.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
volume
53
issue
4
pages
309 - 325
publisher
Routledge
external identifiers
  • wos:000279842900001
  • scopus:77954464450
ISSN
0020-174X
DOI
10.1080/0020174X.2010.493366
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
704e27a6-44e5-43ff-8605-9da6acc9d099 (old id 1554316)
date added to LUP
2010-03-08 09:26:54
date last changed
2018-05-29 09:48:08
@article{704e27a6-44e5-43ff-8605-9da6acc9d099,
  abstract     = {<b>Abstract in Undetermined</b><br/><br>
In this paper I criticize the standard argument for deontological egalitarianism, understood as the thesis that there is a moral claim to have an equal share of well-being or whatever other good counts. That argument is based on the idea that equals should be treated equally. I connect the debate over egalitarianism with that over comparative justice. A common theme is a general skepticism against comparative claims. I argue (i) that there can be no claim to equality based simply on the fact of equal worth as that fact itself does not have any value for the supposed claim holder; and (ii) intuitions that suggest otherwise can be explained away without appealing to comparative claims.},
  author       = {Alm, David},
  issn         = {0020-174X},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {309--325},
  publisher    = {Routledge},
  series       = { Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy},
  title        = {Equality and Comparative Justice},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2010.493366},
  volume       = {53},
  year         = {2010},
}