Getting Personal : The Intuition of Neutrality Reinterpreted
(2022) In Oxford Handbooks p.114-141- Abstract
- According to the Intuition of Neutrality, there is a range of well-being levels such that adding people with lives at these levels doesn’t make the world either better or worse. As lives in the neutral range can be good for those who live them, this intuition is in conflict with one of the main tenets of welfarism; it creates a disparity between what is good for a person and what is impersonally good. Adding a person with a good life needn’t make the world better. An earlier article, “Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality” (Rabinowicz 2009) suggested but did not elaborate a reinterpretation of the neutral range that would remove the problematic disparity. On this reinterpretation, a life at a level within the neutral range is not merely... (More)
- According to the Intuition of Neutrality, there is a range of well-being levels such that adding people with lives at these levels doesn’t make the world either better or worse. As lives in the neutral range can be good for those who live them, this intuition is in conflict with one of the main tenets of welfarism; it creates a disparity between what is good for a person and what is impersonally good. Adding a person with a good life needn’t make the world better. An earlier article, “Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality” (Rabinowicz 2009) suggested but did not elaborate a reinterpretation of the neutral range that would remove the problematic disparity. On this reinterpretation, a life at a level within the neutral range is not merely impersonally neutral; it is also neutral in its personal value: neither better nor worse for its owner than non-existence. Nevertheless, among such personally neutral lives, some might still be personally better or worse than others, provided that they are incommensurable in their personal value with non-existence. The present chapter explores some of the implications of this “personalization” of the Intuition of Neutrality. In particular, it discusses its worrisome implications for neutral-range utilitarianism. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1558b57b-4f85-4948-828e-a86273c05e5e
- author
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Intuition of Neutrality, neutral range, neutral life, incommensurability, welfarism, utilitarianism, value of existence, Repugnant Conclusion
- host publication
- The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics : Oxford handbok i populationsetik - Oxford handbok i populationsetik
- series title
- Oxford Handbooks
- editor
- Arrhenius, Gustaf ; Bykvist, Krister ; Campbell, Tim and Finneron-Burns, Elisabeth
- pages
- 24 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- ISBN
- 9780190907709
- 9780190907693
- 9780190907716
- 9780190907686
- DOI
- 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190907686.013.17
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 1558b57b-4f85-4948-828e-a86273c05e5e
- date added to LUP
- 2023-10-23 21:38:02
- date last changed
- 2023-10-26 12:26:38
@inbook{1558b57b-4f85-4948-828e-a86273c05e5e,
abstract = {{According to the Intuition of Neutrality, there is a range of well-being levels such that adding people with lives at these levels doesn’t make the world either better or worse. As lives in the neutral range can be good for those who live them, this intuition is in conflict with one of the main tenets of welfarism; it creates a disparity between what is good for a person and what is impersonally good. Adding a person with a good life needn’t make the world better. An earlier article, “Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality” (Rabinowicz 2009) suggested but did not elaborate a reinterpretation of the neutral range that would remove the problematic disparity. On this reinterpretation, a life at a level within the neutral range is not merely impersonally neutral; it is also neutral in its personal value: neither better nor worse for its owner than non-existence. Nevertheless, among such personally neutral lives, some might still be personally better or worse than others, provided that they are incommensurable in their personal value with non-existence. The present chapter explores some of the implications of this “personalization” of the Intuition of Neutrality. In particular, it discusses its worrisome implications for neutral-range utilitarianism.}},
author = {{Rabinowicz, Wlodek}},
booktitle = {{The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics : Oxford handbok i populationsetik}},
editor = {{Arrhenius, Gustaf and Bykvist, Krister and Campbell, Tim and Finneron-Burns, Elisabeth}},
isbn = {{9780190907709}},
keywords = {{Intuition of Neutrality; neutral range; neutral life; incommensurability; welfarism; utilitarianism; value of existence; Repugnant Conclusion}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{114--141}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
series = {{Oxford Handbooks}},
title = {{Getting Personal : The Intuition of Neutrality Reinterpreted}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190907686.013.17}},
doi = {{10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190907686.013.17}},
year = {{2022}},
}