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Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason: A Constitutivist Framework

Alm, David LU (2011) In Journal of Philosophical Research 36. p.77-102
Abstract (Swedish)
Abstract in Undetermined

In this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according to which it is possible to defend fundamental requirements of practical reason by appeal to facts about what is constitutive of rational agency. I show how it is possible for that approach to circumvent the 'is'/'ought' problem as well as the requirement that it be possible to act contrary to practical reason. But I do not attempt to establish any particular fundamental requirement. The key ideas are that such a requirement is not genuine if it is arbitrary, and that it is arbitrary just in case (a) it needs explanation and (b) that explanation could not, even in principle, be provided.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Journal of Philosophical Research
volume
36
pages
77 - 102
publisher
Philosophy Documentation Center
external identifiers
  • wos:000288627500005
  • scopus:84875440394
ISSN
1053-8364
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
7d9c8e2c-037f-40a9-9940-f5dcaa5b38dd (old id 1600183)
date added to LUP
2010-05-10 10:54:52
date last changed
2017-01-01 06:25:13
@article{7d9c8e2c-037f-40a9-9940-f5dcaa5b38dd,
  abstract     = {<b>Abstract in Undetermined</b><br/><br>
In this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according to which it is possible to defend fundamental requirements of practical reason by appeal to facts about what is constitutive of rational agency. I show how it is possible for that approach to circumvent the 'is'/'ought' problem as well as the requirement that it be possible to act contrary to practical reason. But I do not attempt to establish any particular fundamental requirement. The key ideas are that such a requirement is not genuine if it is arbitrary, and that it is arbitrary just in case (a) it needs explanation and (b) that explanation could not, even in principle, be provided.},
  author       = {Alm, David},
  issn         = {1053-8364},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {77--102},
  publisher    = {Philosophy Documentation Center},
  series       = {Journal of Philosophical Research},
  title        = {Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason: A Constitutivist Framework},
  volume       = {36},
  year         = {2011},
}