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Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation

Strandberg, Caj LU (1999) In Theoria 65. p.171-192
Abstract
Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers have argued that moral properties are dispositions. According to one version of this view, most clearly represented by Jonathan Dancy, a moral property is the property of being such, having base properties such, that an entity with the property elicits morally merited and motivating responses. Its proponents have argued that this notion can explain how moral judgements can be objective in the sense of expressing properties that are independent of will and yet imply motivation by those who assert them. In special consideration of Dancy's Moral Reasons, I argue that the dispositional account does not save the idea of objectivity in the required sense and... (More)
Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers have argued that moral properties are dispositions. According to one version of this view, most clearly represented by Jonathan Dancy, a moral property is the property of being such, having base properties such, that an entity with the property elicits morally merited and motivating responses. Its proponents have argued that this notion can explain how moral judgements can be objective in the sense of expressing properties that are independent of will and yet imply motivation by those who assert them. In special consideration of Dancy's Moral Reasons, I argue that the dispositional account does not save the idea of objectivity in the required sense and implies an untenable view of moral motivation. I therefore conclude that the dispositional account fails to explain the two features of moral judgements. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Theoria
volume
65
pages
171 - 192
publisher
Thales
external identifiers
  • Scopus:77949516419
ISSN
0040-5825
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
b9f15771-6647-4a88-959f-9f6f0e712b75 (old id 1635948)
date added to LUP
2010-08-23 12:07:21
date last changed
2017-01-01 07:42:06
@article{b9f15771-6647-4a88-959f-9f6f0e712b75,
  abstract     = {Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers have argued that moral properties are dispositions. According to one version of this view, most clearly represented by Jonathan Dancy, a moral property is the property of being such, having base properties such, that an entity with the property elicits morally merited and motivating responses. Its proponents have argued that this notion can explain how moral judgements can be objective in the sense of expressing properties that are independent of will and yet imply motivation by those who assert them. In special consideration of Dancy's Moral Reasons, I argue that the dispositional account does not save the idea of objectivity in the required sense and implies an untenable view of moral motivation. I therefore conclude that the dispositional account fails to explain the two features of moral judgements.},
  author       = {Strandberg, Caj},
  issn         = {0040-5825},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {171--192},
  publisher    = {Thales},
  series       = {Theoria},
  title        = {Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation},
  volume       = {65},
  year         = {1999},
}