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Trope theory and the Bradley regress

Maurin, Anna-Sofia LU (2010) In Synthese 175(3). p.311-326
Abstract
Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in contradiction, nonsense, or will lead to a vicious infinite regress. I investigate Bradley's argument and claim that it fails to prove what it sets out to. It fails, I argue, because it does not take all the different ways in which relation and relata may depend on one another... (More)
Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in contradiction, nonsense, or will lead to a vicious infinite regress. I investigate Bradley's argument and claim that it fails to prove what it sets out to. It fails, I argue, because it does not take all the different ways in which relation and relata may depend on one another into account. If relations are entities that are distinct from yet essentially dependent upon their relata, the Bradleyan problem is solved. We are then free to say that tropes in compresence are what make true propositions ostensibly made true by concrete particulars. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Truth maker, Trope theory, Bradley regress
in
Synthese
volume
175
issue
3
pages
311 - 326
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000280823500002
  • scopus:77955587186
ISSN
0039-7857
DOI
10.1007/s11229-009-9511-2
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
bc764729-74ab-4e19-a9ee-bf3cfaa9cd32 (old id 1674063)
date added to LUP
2010-09-22 13:59:10
date last changed
2018-07-15 04:03:05
@article{bc764729-74ab-4e19-a9ee-bf3cfaa9cd32,
  abstract     = {Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in contradiction, nonsense, or will lead to a vicious infinite regress. I investigate Bradley's argument and claim that it fails to prove what it sets out to. It fails, I argue, because it does not take all the different ways in which relation and relata may depend on one another into account. If relations are entities that are distinct from yet essentially dependent upon their relata, the Bradleyan problem is solved. We are then free to say that tropes in compresence are what make true propositions ostensibly made true by concrete particulars.},
  author       = {Maurin, Anna-Sofia},
  issn         = {0039-7857},
  keyword      = {Truth maker,Trope theory,Bradley regress},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {311--326},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Synthese},
  title        = {Trope theory and the Bradley regress},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9511-2},
  volume       = {175},
  year         = {2010},
}