Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences
(2023) In Behavioural Public Policy 7(1). p.83-114- Abstract
- We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead... (More)
- We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information. (Less)
- Abstract (Swedish)
- We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to overengage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it, and measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated... (More)
- We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to overengage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it, and measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations—subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/16e574c3-3327-42f0-8221-0749daba2c17
- author
- Nordström, Jonas LU ; Thunström, Linda ; van 't Veld, Klaas ; Shogren, Jason F. and Ehmke, Mariah
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023-01-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Strategic ignorance, Willful ignorance, Optimal expectations, menu labeling, calorie information, Strategic ignorance, Willful ignorance, Optimal expectations, Menu labeling, Calorie information
- in
- Behavioural Public Policy
- volume
- 7
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 32 pages
- publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85158837811
- ISSN
- 2398-0648
- DOI
- 10.1017/bpp.2019.52
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 16e574c3-3327-42f0-8221-0749daba2c17
- date added to LUP
- 2020-02-04 12:46:04
- date last changed
- 2024-01-04 22:41:30
@article{16e574c3-3327-42f0-8221-0749daba2c17,
abstract = {{We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.}},
author = {{Nordström, Jonas and Thunström, Linda and van 't Veld, Klaas and Shogren, Jason F. and Ehmke, Mariah}},
issn = {{2398-0648}},
keywords = {{Strategic ignorance; Willful ignorance; Optimal expectations; menu labeling; calorie information; Strategic ignorance; Willful ignorance; Optimal expectations; Menu labeling; Calorie information}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{01}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{83--114}},
publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
series = {{Behavioural Public Policy}},
title = {{Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2019.52}},
doi = {{10.1017/bpp.2019.52}},
volume = {{7}},
year = {{2023}},
}