Judgmental Alternatives, Empathy, and Moral Responsibility
(2018) In Philosophical Studies 175(4). p.973-980- Abstract
- In Responsibility From the Margins, David Shoemaker distinguishes three forms of responsibility: attributability, answerability, and accountability. The introduction of various normative competence requirements lends precision to the contrasts that Shoemaker draws between these forms of responsibility. I argue, however, that these competence requirements are less well motivated than Shoemaker supposes, which raises the possibility that we cannot distinguish between forms of responsibility in the way that he hopes.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1754a98f-598c-47ad-b3c9-483f704dac9c
- author
- Talbert, Matthew LU
- publishing date
- 2018
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Moral responsibility
- in
- Philosophical Studies
- volume
- 175
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 973 - 980
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85041189744
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11098-018-1046-2
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 1754a98f-598c-47ad-b3c9-483f704dac9c
- date added to LUP
- 2019-05-28 14:36:50
- date last changed
- 2022-01-31 21:04:33
@misc{1754a98f-598c-47ad-b3c9-483f704dac9c,
abstract = {{In Responsibility From the Margins, David Shoemaker distinguishes three forms of responsibility: attributability, answerability, and accountability. The introduction of various normative competence requirements lends precision to the contrasts that Shoemaker draws between these forms of responsibility. I argue, however, that these competence requirements are less well motivated than Shoemaker supposes, which raises the possibility that we cannot distinguish between forms of responsibility in the way that he hopes.}},
author = {{Talbert, Matthew}},
issn = {{0031-8116}},
keywords = {{Moral responsibility}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Review}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{973--980}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Philosophical Studies}},
title = {{Judgmental Alternatives, Empathy, and Moral Responsibility}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1046-2}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11098-018-1046-2}},
volume = {{175}},
year = {{2018}},
}