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The indexical 'I': The first person in thought and language

Brinck, Ingar LU (1997) In Synthese Library 265.
Abstract (Swedish)
Popular Abstract in Swedish

Boken handlar om jag-begreppet i tanke och tal. Huvudfrågan är vad vi menar när vi säger 'jag. Relaterade frågor rör vilka sorters jag-kunskap och självmedvetande som behövs för att kunna tala om sig själv. Betoningen ligger på menings- och referensteorier, men ett stort utrymme ägnas även åt jag-tankar och jagbegreppets roll för tänkande i allmänhet.
Abstract
The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition.



The first part of the book constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how 'I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of 'I'. It is argued that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. 'I' expresses... (More)
The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition.



The first part of the book constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how 'I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of 'I'. It is argued that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. 'I' expresses an individual concept with two components: the de re sense and a context-independent, fundamental self-concept.



By interacting with the environment the subject forms belifs about herself that are essentially first-personal. To have a full-blown self-consciousness and be a competent speaker of 'I', the subject must be able to connect these indexical beliefs with general ones and thus conceive of herself as part of the objective order. The use of 'I' moreover presupposes unity of consciousness and identity over time on the part of the speaker. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
opponent
  • Professor Engel, Pascal, CREA
organization
publishing date
type
Thesis
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Teoretisk filosofi, context, self, meaning, indexicality, reference, Philosophical logic, personal identity
in
Synthese Library
volume
265
pages
178 pages
publisher
Kluwer
defense location
Carolinasalen, Kungshuset
defense date
1997-09-27 10:00
external identifiers
  • other:ISRN: LUHFDA/HFFT--97/1009--SE
ISSN
0459-2603
ISBN
0-7923-4741-2
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
c7b50106-49fb-4cd1-a64a-880ac67b72ef (old id 18090)
date added to LUP
2007-05-24 11:05:59
date last changed
2016-10-11 08:28:43
@phdthesis{c7b50106-49fb-4cd1-a64a-880ac67b72ef,
  abstract     = {The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition.<br/><br>
<br/><br>
The first part of the book constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how 'I' refers, while the second part advances a positive account of 'I'. It is argued that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense that is based on non-conceptual content. 'I' expresses an individual concept with two components: the de re sense and a context-independent, fundamental self-concept.<br/><br>
<br/><br>
By interacting with the environment the subject forms belifs about herself that are essentially first-personal. To have a full-blown self-consciousness and be a competent speaker of 'I', the subject must be able to connect these indexical beliefs with general ones and thus conceive of herself as part of the objective order. The use of 'I' moreover presupposes unity of consciousness and identity over time on the part of the speaker.},
  author       = {Brinck, Ingar},
  isbn         = {0-7923-4741-2},
  issn         = {0459-2603},
  keyword      = {Teoretisk filosofi,context,self,meaning,indexicality,reference,Philosophical logic,personal identity},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {178},
  publisher    = {Kluwer},
  school       = {Lund University},
  series       = {Synthese Library},
  title        = {The indexical 'I': The first person in thought and language},
  volume       = {265},
  year         = {1997},
}