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Assortativity Evolving from Social Dilemmas

Nax, Heinrich H and Rigos, Alexandros LU (2016) In Journal of Theoretical Biology 395. p.194-203
Abstract
Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable in most cases, independent of the relative speeds of both processes. The exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma matters crucially. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying... (More)
Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable in most cases, independent of the relative speeds of both processes. The exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma matters crucially. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent the tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome. (Less)
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author
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Cooperation, (co-)evolution, Assortativity, Democratic consensus
in
Journal of Theoretical Biology
volume
395
pages
10 pages
publisher
Academic Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:84958978133
ISSN
0022-5193
DOI
10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032
language
English
LU publication?
no
id
185951de-5dfc-48d4-b34b-20d6344d1e37
date added to LUP
2016-10-25 14:32:02
date last changed
2017-01-25 03:00:06
@article{185951de-5dfc-48d4-b34b-20d6344d1e37,
  abstract     = {Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable in most cases, independent of the relative speeds of both processes. The exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma matters crucially. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent the tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome.},
  author       = {Nax, Heinrich H and Rigos, Alexandros},
  issn         = {0022-5193},
  keyword      = {Cooperation,(co-)evolution,Assortativity,Democratic consensus},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {04},
  pages        = {194--203},
  publisher    = {Academic Press},
  series       = {Journal of Theoretical Biology},
  title        = {Assortativity Evolving from Social Dilemmas},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032},
  volume       = {395},
  year         = {2016},
}