Advanced

Physical Persons. An Essay on Reconciliatory Physicalism

Hartman, Jan LU (1999)
Abstract
<i>Physical Persons</i> explores the nature of mind and self, and their relation to the body. It argues that folk-psychological expressions about persons are indeed irreducible and true, however, this can be reconciled with the view that persons are physical beings. Not only is it argued that what we call 'mental properties' are in fact physical properties, but also that what we refer to as 'the self' is the physical brain.



The solution to both these problems is based on the idea that what we refer to as 'mental properties' and 'the self' are systematically elusive, or transcendent. What we know of 'mental properties' is only their content, the 'virtual' objects they have. But since such objects do not exist,... (More)
<i>Physical Persons</i> explores the nature of mind and self, and their relation to the body. It argues that folk-psychological expressions about persons are indeed irreducible and true, however, this can be reconciled with the view that persons are physical beings. Not only is it argued that what we call 'mental properties' are in fact physical properties, but also that what we refer to as 'the self' is the physical brain.



The solution to both these problems is based on the idea that what we refer to as 'mental properties' and 'the self' are systematically elusive, or transcendent. What we know of 'mental properties' is only their content, the 'virtual' objects they have. But since such objects do not exist, they constitute no threat to physicalism. The self, on the other hand, is a theoretical entity which gives a person his identity and unifies his mind. Since the self is theoretical, it can be identified with the brain. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
opponent
  • Dr. Stjernberg, Fredrik, Växjö University
organization
publishing date
type
Thesis
publication status
published
subject
keywords
self-brain, unity of mind, personal identity, self, mental properties, physicalism, mind-body, Philosophical logic, Teoretisk filosofi, logik
pages
265 pages
publisher
Förlags AB Gondolin
defense location
Sal 104 Kungshuset
defense date
1999-12-18 10:15
external identifiers
  • Other:ISRN: LUHFDA/HFFT--99/1010--SE+265
ISBN
91-88820-85-8
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
838db915-f292-4112-8cee-412eaafeb0de (old id 19189)
date added to LUP
2007-05-25 12:01:13
date last changed
2016-09-19 08:45:12
@phdthesis{838db915-f292-4112-8cee-412eaafeb0de,
  abstract     = {&lt;i&gt;Physical Persons&lt;/i&gt; explores the nature of mind and self, and their relation to the body. It argues that folk-psychological expressions about persons are indeed irreducible and true, however, this can be reconciled with the view that persons are physical beings. Not only is it argued that what we call 'mental properties' are in fact physical properties, but also that what we refer to as 'the self' is the physical brain.<br/><br>
<br/><br>
The solution to both these problems is based on the idea that what we refer to as 'mental properties' and 'the self' are systematically elusive, or transcendent. What we know of 'mental properties' is only their content, the 'virtual' objects they have. But since such objects do not exist, they constitute no threat to physicalism. The self, on the other hand, is a theoretical entity which gives a person his identity and unifies his mind. Since the self is theoretical, it can be identified with the brain.},
  author       = {Hartman, Jan},
  isbn         = {91-88820-85-8},
  keyword      = {self-brain,unity of mind,personal identity,self,mental properties,physicalism,mind-body,Philosophical logic,Teoretisk filosofi,logik},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {265},
  publisher    = {Förlags AB Gondolin},
  school       = {Lund University},
  title        = {Physical Persons. An Essay on Reconciliatory Physicalism},
  year         = {1999},
}