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Skuld

Cavallin, Samuel LU (1999)
Abstract (Swedish)
Popular Abstract in Swedish

Gränsen mellan uppsåt och oaktsamhet har gäckat rättsvetenskap och praktiker under 1900-talet. Åtskilliga gånger har uppsåtsdebattens vågor även gått höga i massmedia. Ett exempel är uppståndelsen över hovrättens dom i det så kallade Klippanmålet. Sedan några år finns också ett förslag från den statliga utredningen, "Straffansvarets gränser", att lösa problemet med lagstiftning. Skillnaden mellan uppsåt och oaktsamhet är särskilt svårfångad, eftersom alla förslag till gränsdragning är intimt förknippade med ideologiska och moraliska ställningstaganden. Man måste dessutom inom dessa valda ramar bestämma sig för vad som är möjligt att bevisa, vad som är möjligt att reglera och slutligen om... (More)
Popular Abstract in Swedish

Gränsen mellan uppsåt och oaktsamhet har gäckat rättsvetenskap och praktiker under 1900-talet. Åtskilliga gånger har uppsåtsdebattens vågor även gått höga i massmedia. Ett exempel är uppståndelsen över hovrättens dom i det så kallade Klippanmålet. Sedan några år finns också ett förslag från den statliga utredningen, "Straffansvarets gränser", att lösa problemet med lagstiftning. Skillnaden mellan uppsåt och oaktsamhet är särskilt svårfångad, eftersom alla förslag till gränsdragning är intimt förknippade med ideologiska och moraliska ställningstaganden. Man måste dessutom inom dessa valda ramar bestämma sig för vad som är möjligt att bevisa, vad som är möjligt att reglera och slutligen om lagstiftaren, rättspraxis eller rättsvetenskapen skall bära huvudansvaret för den rättsliga utvecklingen. Den lösning på problemet som presenteras i boken står så att säga på det straffrättsliga verkstadsgolvet. Utgångspunkten tas nämligen i en analys av de tingsrättsdomar för uppsåtligt och oaktsamt dödande samt grov misshandel, som avkunnats med påföljden fängelse under åren 1989-1992, där dessa brott utgjort huvudbrott. Resultatet av denna undersökning visar att tingsrätternas prövningsmetoder avviker från de gängse doktrinära. I tingsrätterna bedöms uppsåt främst med utgångspunkt i gärningens mening eller inriktning och inte som ett fristående "inre" element. I en konfrontation med övriga rättskällor hävdar sig denna prövningsmetod teoretiskt och praktiskt väl. (Less)
Abstract
The description and explanation of the determination of mens rea, or fault, in this thesis begins so to speak, at the “shop-floor” of criminal law. The analysis is based on a survey of judgements of the Swedish courts of first instance for the years 1989-1992 in cases involving intentional killing, causing death through recklessness/negligence as well as gross assault, where such offences constituted the principal crimes. The result of this survey is contrasted with the treatment in other sources of law such as the preliminary work for legislation, academic writings, precedents and legislation considered elsewhere in this thesis. The finding of this comparison is that the act-oriented approach of the courts of first instance is different,... (More)
The description and explanation of the determination of mens rea, or fault, in this thesis begins so to speak, at the “shop-floor” of criminal law. The analysis is based on a survey of judgements of the Swedish courts of first instance for the years 1989-1992 in cases involving intentional killing, causing death through recklessness/negligence as well as gross assault, where such offences constituted the principal crimes. The result of this survey is contrasted with the treatment in other sources of law such as the preliminary work for legislation, academic writings, precedents and legislation considered elsewhere in this thesis. The finding of this comparison is that the act-oriented approach of the courts of first instance is different, both practically and theoretically, to the traditional doctrinal solutions. Traditionally, the ascription of fault in criminal law is tantamount to the ascription of intent, recklessness or negligence. The problem of fault hinges upon the distinction between dolus and culpa. The “modern” criminal law doctrine is characterised by the idea that criminal liability must be divided into an objective and a subjective part, or, in other words, the actus reus and the mens rea. This is often called the core of “modern” criminal law. One presupposes —on empirical grounds or with reference to a definite theory of action— that fault determination must begin with an investigation of the action ”as such”, seen purely as a series of bodily movements. Only when it is found that the act “as such” infringes some criminal rules, does one need to examine whether the observed bodily movements are “covered” by the element of dolus or culpa, as a kind of separate “inner” element. I submit that this method of judgement is a blind alley. My main thesis is that a greater degree of justice and legal certainty can be attained if more emphasis is put on the principle of fault. The determination of fault must, however, be objectivised. The determination of criminal liability must therefore begin with the consideration of a meaningful action. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
opponent
  • Associated Professor Herlitz, Carl Erik
organization
alternative title
Fault
publishing date
type
Thesis
publication status
published
subject
keywords
criminal, fault, guilt, concept of crime, culpa, subjective, objective, dolus, criminal proceedings, dolus ex re, praesumptio doli, intent, criminal law, mens rea, straffrätt
pages
802 pages
publisher
Iustus förlag
defense location
Carolinasalen, Kungshuset, Lund
defense date
1999-09-18 10:15
external identifiers
  • other:LUJUDV/JUST--99/1001--SE 802
ISBN
91-7678-421-5
language
Swedish
LU publication?
yes
id
5883162f-4db2-4d80-8f0f-631c06bc1167 (old id 19262)
date added to LUP
2007-05-25 08:07:12
date last changed
2016-09-19 08:45:03
@phdthesis{5883162f-4db2-4d80-8f0f-631c06bc1167,
  abstract     = {The description and explanation of the determination of mens rea, or fault, in this thesis begins so to speak, at the “shop-floor” of criminal law. The analysis is based on a survey of judgements of the Swedish courts of first instance for the years 1989-1992 in cases involving intentional killing, causing death through recklessness/negligence as well as gross assault, where such offences constituted the principal crimes. The result of this survey is contrasted with the treatment in other sources of law such as the preliminary work for legislation, academic writings, precedents and legislation considered elsewhere in this thesis. The finding of this comparison is that the act-oriented approach of the courts of first instance is different, both practically and theoretically, to the traditional doctrinal solutions. Traditionally, the ascription of fault in criminal law is tantamount to the ascription of intent, recklessness or negligence. The problem of fault hinges upon the distinction between dolus and culpa. The “modern” criminal law doctrine is characterised by the idea that criminal liability must be divided into an objective and a subjective part, or, in other words, the actus reus and the mens rea. This is often called the core of “modern” criminal law. One presupposes —on empirical grounds or with reference to a definite theory of action— that fault determination must begin with an investigation of the action ”as such”, seen purely as a series of bodily movements. Only when it is found that the act “as such” infringes some criminal rules, does one need to examine whether the observed bodily movements are “covered” by the element of dolus or culpa, as a kind of separate “inner” element. I submit that this method of judgement is a blind alley. My main thesis is that a greater degree of justice and legal certainty can be attained if more emphasis is put on the principle of fault. The determination of fault must, however, be objectivised. The determination of criminal liability must therefore begin with the consideration of a meaningful action.},
  author       = {Cavallin, Samuel},
  isbn         = {91-7678-421-5},
  keyword      = {criminal,fault,guilt,concept of crime,culpa,subjective,objective,dolus,criminal proceedings,dolus ex re,praesumptio doli,intent,criminal law,mens rea,straffrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  pages        = {802},
  publisher    = {Iustus förlag},
  school       = {Lund University},
  title        = {Skuld},
  year         = {1999},
}