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A Structural Disanalogy between Aesthetic and Ethical Value Judgements

Strandberg, Caj LU (2011) In British Journal of Aesthetics 51(1). p.51-67
Abstract
It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgements are similar in such a way that they should be analysed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgements share four important, features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgements can be analysed in accordance with the same dispositional scheme which corresponds to the analogy between secondary qualities and values. However, I argue that aesthetic and ethical value judgements differ as regards their fundamental structures. This scheme is mistaken as regards ethical value judgements, but it is able to account... (More)
It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgements are similar in such a way that they should be analysed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgements share four important, features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgements can be analysed in accordance with the same dispositional scheme which corresponds to the analogy between secondary qualities and values. However, I argue that aesthetic and ethical value judgements differ as regards their fundamental structures. This scheme is mistaken as regards ethical value judgements, but it is able to account for aesthetic value judgements. This implies that aesthetic value judgements are autonomous in relation to ethical value judements and that aestheticians, not moral philosophers, are the true heirs Phis renowned analogy. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
British Journal of Aesthetics
volume
51
issue
1
pages
51 - 67
publisher
Oxford University Press
external identifiers
  • wos:000287069000004
  • scopus:78751487017
ISSN
0007-0904
DOI
10.1093/aesthj/ayq025
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
3f7c6ff4-eb6e-4c4e-8019-658538e208a9 (old id 1936337)
date added to LUP
2011-05-10 08:58:04
date last changed
2017-10-01 04:18:28
@article{3f7c6ff4-eb6e-4c4e-8019-658538e208a9,
  abstract     = {It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgements are similar in such a way that they should be analysed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgements share four important, features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgements can be analysed in accordance with the same dispositional scheme which corresponds to the analogy between secondary qualities and values. However, I argue that aesthetic and ethical value judgements differ as regards their fundamental structures. This scheme is mistaken as regards ethical value judgements, but it is able to account for aesthetic value judgements. This implies that aesthetic value judgements are autonomous in relation to ethical value judements and that aestheticians, not moral philosophers, are the true heirs Phis renowned analogy.},
  author       = {Strandberg, Caj},
  issn         = {0007-0904},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {51--67},
  publisher    = {Oxford University Press},
  series       = {British Journal of Aesthetics},
  title        = {A Structural Disanalogy between Aesthetic and Ethical Value Judgements},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayq025},
  volume       = {51},
  year         = {2011},
}