Of boundaries and metaphysical starting points: why the extended mind cannot be so lightly dismissed
(2011) In Teorema 30(2). p.79-94- Abstract
- The extended mind debate is, to large extent, a debate over where and how to locate the boundary between cognitive mind and non-cognitive world. Concepts of “internal” and “external”, taken from the domain of physical volumes, are metaphorical, at best, applied to entities like mind. Strongly held intuitions betray metaphysical starting points that prejudice the debate. If one does not accept these starting points, then the “just obvious” claims made by critics of extended mind are far less clear. The mind/world distinction is, ultimately, a conceptual one, and like most if not all conceptual distinctions, subject to shift over time.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1968436
- author
- Parthemore, Joel LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2011
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- boundary, intuitions, realism, anti-realism, enactivism
- in
- Teorema
- volume
- 30
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 79 - 94
- publisher
- KRK Ediciones
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000291485000005
- scopus:79959305670
- ISSN
- 0210-1602
- project
- Centre for Cognitive Semiotics (RJ)
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 98f115d9-dd83-403c-b15b-9054c5370b06 (old id 1968436)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 09:13:59
- date last changed
- 2023-11-15 13:25:48
@article{98f115d9-dd83-403c-b15b-9054c5370b06, abstract = {{The extended mind debate is, to large extent, a debate over where and how to locate the boundary between cognitive mind and non-cognitive world. Concepts of “internal” and “external”, taken from the domain of physical volumes, are metaphorical, at best, applied to entities like mind. Strongly held intuitions betray metaphysical starting points that prejudice the debate. If one does not accept these starting points, then the “just obvious” claims made by critics of extended mind are far less clear. The mind/world distinction is, ultimately, a conceptual one, and like most if not all conceptual distinctions, subject to shift over time.}}, author = {{Parthemore, Joel}}, issn = {{0210-1602}}, keywords = {{boundary; intuitions; realism; anti-realism; enactivism}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{79--94}}, publisher = {{KRK Ediciones}}, series = {{Teorema}}, title = {{Of boundaries and metaphysical starting points: why the extended mind cannot be so lightly dismissed}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2011}}, }