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Team reasoning and collective moral obligation

Blomberg, Olle LU orcid and Petersson, Björn LU (2023) In Social Theory and Practice
Abstract
We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it doesn’t imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight various distinctive features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an agential perspective.
Abstract (Swedish)
We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents can only have a moral obligation together if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to regard their situation from the group’s perspective and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective in that it doesn’t imply that the individuals have obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight distinct features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an assumed agential perspective.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
epub
subject
keywords
collective moral obligation, group identification, we-framing, team reasoning, joint ability, agent-relativity
in
Social Theory and Practice
publisher
Florida State University
ISSN
0037-802X
DOI
10.5840/soctheorpract2023120177
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
1c557c36-2758-4ab2-8ee0-eb4f9b2afbda
date added to LUP
2022-03-05 11:45:30
date last changed
2023-02-15 02:28:45
@article{1c557c36-2758-4ab2-8ee0-eb4f9b2afbda,
  abstract     = {{We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it doesn’t imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight various distinctive features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an agential perspective.}},
  author       = {{Blomberg, Olle and Petersson, Björn}},
  issn         = {{0037-802X}},
  keywords     = {{collective moral obligation; group identification; we-framing; team reasoning; joint ability; agent-relativity}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{01}},
  publisher    = {{Florida State University}},
  series       = {{Social Theory and Practice}},
  title        = {{Team reasoning and collective moral obligation}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract2023120177}},
  doi          = {{10.5840/soctheorpract2023120177}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}