The Value Gap
(2022)- Abstract
- In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more... (More)
- In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the key elements of this analysis—reasons and pro-attitudes—Rønnow-Rasmussen challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas. The result is that the gap between favouring for a reason what is good and favouring for a reason what is good for someone appears insurmountable. (Less)
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Evaluations about what is good (period) and what is good for someone shape much of ethics. The two value notions ‘good’ and ‘good for’ mark the deep-rooted divide between the impersonally and personally valuable—the value divide on which The Value Gap centres. Past and contemporary philosophers have argued it is a mistake to believe that these two value notions give rise to unresolvable value conflicts. This book argues that they are wrong.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1dbcf4f5-2ea5-4c73-86d0-574d8009f86d
- author
- Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Book/Report
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Värdeteori, bra vs. bra-för, Value theory, Final Goodness, Final goodness-for, Fitting-attitude analyses, Reason analysis, Attitude analyses, Metaethics, value dilemmas
- pages
- 240 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- ISBN
- 978-0-19-284821-5
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 1dbcf4f5-2ea5-4c73-86d0-574d8009f86d
- date added to LUP
- 2021-03-27 15:48:35
- date last changed
- 2024-06-20 12:30:53
@book{1dbcf4f5-2ea5-4c73-86d0-574d8009f86d,
abstract = {{In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the key elements of this analysis—reasons and pro-attitudes—Rønnow-Rasmussen challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas. The result is that the gap between favouring for a reason what is good and favouring for a reason what is good for someone appears insurmountable.}},
author = {{Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni}},
isbn = {{978-0-19-284821-5}},
keywords = {{Värdeteori, bra vs. bra-för; Value theory; Final Goodness; Final goodness-for; Fitting-attitude analyses; Reason analysis; Attitude analyses; Metaethics; value dilemmas}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
title = {{The Value Gap}},
year = {{2022}},
}