Skip to main content

Lund University Publications

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Military Rivalries, Alliances and Taxation : The International Origins of Modern Fiscal Contracts

Goenaga, Augustín LU and von Hagen-Jamar, Alexander LU (2016) In STANCE Working Papers Series 2016(11).
Abstract
Bellicist theories of comparative development predict increases in taxation as the result of military rivalries. Others claim that this causal relationship is contingent on particular geographical, institutional, and historical conditions. In this paper, we explore the conditional effects of military rivalries on taxation during the 19th and 20th centuries using time-series cross-section models. We hypothesize that international norms of territoriality, inter-state military alliances, and regime type will condition the direction and magnitude of the effect of rivalries on taxation. Our models suggest that from 1815 to 1945 the effects of rivalry on taxation were insignificant independently of these systemic, dyadic, and institutional... (More)
Bellicist theories of comparative development predict increases in taxation as the result of military rivalries. Others claim that this causal relationship is contingent on particular geographical, institutional, and historical conditions. In this paper, we explore the conditional effects of military rivalries on taxation during the 19th and 20th centuries using time-series cross-section models. We hypothesize that international norms of territoriality, inter-state military alliances, and regime type will condition the direction and magnitude of the effect of rivalries on taxation. Our models suggest that from 1815 to 1945 the effects of rivalry on taxation were insignificant independently of these systemic, dyadic, and institutional factors. However, after 1945 when norms of territorial integrity consolidated, democracies with strong military allies responded to military pressures by lowering taxes in the short-term, reoriented public expenditures towards social spending, and ultimately increased taxes in the long run through a reconfiguration of the fiscal contract. Conversely, autocracies with strong allies responded to military pressures by increasing taxes in the short-term, capturing as much wealth as possible but failing to consolidate durable fiscal institutions.
(Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Working paper/Preprint
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Military Rivalries, Alliances, Taxation, Fiscal Contracts
in
STANCE Working Papers Series
volume
2016
issue
11
pages
41 pages
project
State-Making and the Origins of Global Order in the Long Nineteenth Century and Beyond
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
21783f1e-2b99-4e98-b114-752383294d43
date added to LUP
2016-09-22 15:59:46
date last changed
2025-04-04 14:38:15
@misc{21783f1e-2b99-4e98-b114-752383294d43,
  abstract     = {{Bellicist theories of comparative development predict increases in taxation as the result of military rivalries. Others claim that this causal relationship is contingent on particular geographical, institutional, and historical conditions. In this paper, we explore the conditional effects of military rivalries on taxation during the 19th and 20th centuries using time-series cross-section models. We hypothesize that international norms of territoriality, inter-state military alliances, and regime type will condition the direction and magnitude of the effect of rivalries on taxation. Our models suggest that from 1815 to 1945 the effects of rivalry on taxation were insignificant independently of these systemic, dyadic, and institutional factors. However, after 1945 when norms of territorial integrity consolidated, democracies with strong military allies responded to military pressures by lowering taxes in the short-term, reoriented public expenditures towards social spending, and ultimately increased taxes in the long run through a reconfiguration of the fiscal contract. Conversely, autocracies with strong allies responded to military pressures by increasing taxes in the short-term, capturing as much wealth as possible but failing to consolidate durable fiscal institutions.<br/>}},
  author       = {{Goenaga, Augustín and von Hagen-Jamar, Alexander}},
  keywords     = {{Military Rivalries; Alliances; Taxation; Fiscal Contracts}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Working Paper}},
  number       = {{11}},
  series       = {{STANCE Working Papers Series}},
  title        = {{Military Rivalries, Alliances and Taxation : The International Origins of Modern Fiscal Contracts}},
  url          = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/12879573/2016_11_Goenaga_von_Hagen_Jamar.pdf}},
  volume       = {{2016}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}