The Doughnut Fallacy as Deliberative Failure
(2011) In Cogency - Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 3(1). p.147-171- Abstract
- Abstract in Undetermined
The Doughnut fallacy hypothesis posits that many debaters tend to sup- port their arguments using collapsed generalities – such as “democracy” – with pur- ported self-evident positive or negative qualities as philosophical grounding. This will leave an often unexamined hole in the middle of the debate which will stunt delib- erative processes, as it effectively stops deliberation from proceeding to the “philo- sophical core” of the debate. The authors contend that the fallacy is particularly devi- ous as analysis of individual arguments will not necessary detect it (and may in fact conclude that it is evidence of good deliberation) as the problem is only evident on the discourse level. It could be seen as an... (More) - Abstract in Undetermined
The Doughnut fallacy hypothesis posits that many debaters tend to sup- port their arguments using collapsed generalities – such as “democracy” – with pur- ported self-evident positive or negative qualities as philosophical grounding. This will leave an often unexamined hole in the middle of the debate which will stunt delib- erative processes, as it effectively stops deliberation from proceeding to the “philo- sophical core” of the debate. The authors contend that the fallacy is particularly devi- ous as analysis of individual arguments will not necessary detect it (and may in fact conclude that it is evidence of good deliberation) as the problem is only evident on the discourse level. It could be seen as an unexplored subgroup of the already noted Aristotelian fallacy of ambiguity. This piece will explore the fallacy, relate it to extant thinking, formalise assessment of it, and finally prepare the ground for future quan- titative analysis of its deliberative impact (to be carried out on its own or as part of a larger effort, e.g., an index). (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/2224325
- author
- Sundström, Mikael LU and Sigrell, Anders LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2011
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Fallacies, deliberation, debate analysis, congruity, glittering generalities
- in
- Cogency - Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation
- volume
- 3
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 147 - 171
- publisher
- Universidad Diego Portales
- ISSN
- 0718-8285
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- a495b2ec-c28b-4ea5-a7c0-e9595a32fc0f (old id 2224325)
- alternative location
- http://www.cogency.udp.cl/ediciones/5/Cogency_v3_n1_09.pdf
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 13:43:31
- date last changed
- 2021-03-22 14:00:47
@article{a495b2ec-c28b-4ea5-a7c0-e9595a32fc0f, abstract = {{Abstract in Undetermined<br/>The Doughnut fallacy hypothesis posits that many debaters tend to sup- port their arguments using collapsed generalities – such as “democracy” – with pur- ported self-evident positive or negative qualities as philosophical grounding. This will leave an often unexamined hole in the middle of the debate which will stunt delib- erative processes, as it effectively stops deliberation from proceeding to the “philo- sophical core” of the debate. The authors contend that the fallacy is particularly devi- ous as analysis of individual arguments will not necessary detect it (and may in fact conclude that it is evidence of good deliberation) as the problem is only evident on the discourse level. It could be seen as an unexplored subgroup of the already noted Aristotelian fallacy of ambiguity. This piece will explore the fallacy, relate it to extant thinking, formalise assessment of it, and finally prepare the ground for future quan- titative analysis of its deliberative impact (to be carried out on its own or as part of a larger effort, e.g., an index).}}, author = {{Sundström, Mikael and Sigrell, Anders}}, issn = {{0718-8285}}, keywords = {{Fallacies; deliberation; debate analysis; congruity; glittering generalities}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{147--171}}, publisher = {{Universidad Diego Portales}}, series = {{Cogency - Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation}}, title = {{The Doughnut Fallacy as Deliberative Failure}}, url = {{http://www.cogency.udp.cl/ediciones/5/Cogency_v3_n1_09.pdf}}, volume = {{3}}, year = {{2011}}, }