Clean up your own mess : An experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency
Jakob, Michael ; Kübler, Dorothea ; Steckel, Jan Christoph and van Veldhuizen, Roel LU
(2017)
In Journal of Public Economics
155.
p.138-146
- Abstract
Although market-based environmental policy instruments feature prominently in economic theory and are widely employed, they often face public resistance. We argue that such resistance may be driven by moral responsibility, where citizens prefer to tackle the environmental problems that they have caused by themselves, rather than delegating the task to others by means of a market mechanism. Using a laboratory experiment that isolates moral responsibility from alternative explanations, we show that moral responsibility induces participants to take inefficient actions that reduce the earnings of the whole group of participants. We discuss the implications of this finding for the design and implementation of environmental policies.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/234b7708-b588-4bc5-b4d7-edaaa1ebfbd2
- author
- Jakob, Michael
; Kübler, Dorothea
; Steckel, Jan Christoph
and van Veldhuizen, Roel
LU
- publishing date
- 2017-11-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Climate change, Environmental policy, Laboratory experiment, Market mechanism, Moral responsibility
- in
- Journal of Public Economics
- volume
- 155
- pages
- 9 pages
- publisher
- Elsevier
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85032686209
- ISSN
- 0047-2727
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.010
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 234b7708-b588-4bc5-b4d7-edaaa1ebfbd2
- date added to LUP
- 2019-04-08 14:36:30
- date last changed
- 2022-04-18 03:48:15
@article{234b7708-b588-4bc5-b4d7-edaaa1ebfbd2,
abstract = {{<p>Although market-based environmental policy instruments feature prominently in economic theory and are widely employed, they often face public resistance. We argue that such resistance may be driven by moral responsibility, where citizens prefer to tackle the environmental problems that they have caused by themselves, rather than delegating the task to others by means of a market mechanism. Using a laboratory experiment that isolates moral responsibility from alternative explanations, we show that moral responsibility induces participants to take inefficient actions that reduce the earnings of the whole group of participants. We discuss the implications of this finding for the design and implementation of environmental policies.</p>}},
author = {{Jakob, Michael and Kübler, Dorothea and Steckel, Jan Christoph and van Veldhuizen, Roel}},
issn = {{0047-2727}},
keywords = {{Climate change; Environmental policy; Laboratory experiment; Market mechanism; Moral responsibility}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{11}},
pages = {{138--146}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
series = {{Journal of Public Economics}},
title = {{Clean up your own mess : An experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.010}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.010}},
volume = {{155}},
year = {{2017}},
}