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Kripke on Necessity : A Metaphysical Investigation

Theodoridis, Kyriakos LU (2005)
Abstract
I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity (1980). The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm?

My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. The results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general... (More)
I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity (1980). The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm?

My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. The results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general argument of this thesis is sound, then, on this ground, the realist conception of metaphysical essentialism is rejected. The positive thesis of this study is the articulation of certain ways to frame the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori which avoid the problems of realistic essentialism and which suggest a certain transcendental reading of modality.

According to the Kripke Paradigm, any de dicto modal status (of a statement) derives ultimately from the de re modality inherent in the object designated, as the object is characterised by contingent and necessary properties on the ontological level. Thus, the Kripke Paradigm is primarily a thesis in de re realist essentialism.

The final verdict in this study is that the Kripke Paradigm cannot sustain the realistic conception of de re metaphysical essentialism. If we should adopt a transcendental reading of modality, then certain portions of the Kripke Paradigm are valid. I do not delineate or possess the details of a comprehensive doctrine of transcendental metaphysic. Nevertheless, the observations I make should suffice to bring about the rough orientation of how I conceive the notion of transcendental modality. (Less)
Popular Abstract (Swedish)
Den övergripande problemformuleringen i min doktorsavhandling, Kripke on Necessity: A Metaphysical Investigation, kan formuleras på följande sätt: På vilka metafysiska grunder rättfärdigar Kripke giltigheten och existensen av nödvändiga a posteriori och kontingenta a priori satser?

Jag visar att Kripke-paradigmet för den metafysiska essentialismen vilar på ett fundamentalt antagande, nämligen Oberoendeaxiomet, som kan formuleras på följande vis: De metafysiska och epistemiska domänerna är distinkta och ömsesidigt oberoende.

Min undersökning avser att synliggöra de logiska och ontologiska konsekvenser som följer av detta axiom med avseende på en rad Kripkeanska teser, så som: identitetsprincipen, rigid designation, nödvändiga och... (More)
Den övergripande problemformuleringen i min doktorsavhandling, Kripke on Necessity: A Metaphysical Investigation, kan formuleras på följande sätt: På vilka metafysiska grunder rättfärdigar Kripke giltigheten och existensen av nödvändiga a posteriori och kontingenta a priori satser?

Jag visar att Kripke-paradigmet för den metafysiska essentialismen vilar på ett fundamentalt antagande, nämligen Oberoendeaxiomet, som kan formuleras på följande vis: De metafysiska och epistemiska domänerna är distinkta och ömsesidigt oberoende.

Min undersökning avser att synliggöra de logiska och ontologiska konsekvenser som följer av detta axiom med avseende på en rad Kripkeanska teser, så som: identitetsprincipen, rigid designation, nödvändiga och kontingenta egenskaper, föremålsbegreppet samt tänkbarhetsprincipen (conceivability).

I avhandlingen diskuterar jag Kripke-paradigmet genom att anföra ontologiska och metafysiska argument som påvisar att Kripkes realistiska tolkning av essentialismen bör förkastas. Jag föreslår en transcendental läsning av modalitetsbegreppet. Resultatet av min diskussion är att Kripke-paradigmet inte kan rättfärdiga giltigheten och existensen av nödvändiga a posteriori och kontingenta a priori satser. (Less)
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author
supervisor
  • Bengt Hansson
oppenent
  • Prof. Stathis Psillos, University of Athens
organization
year
type
Dissertation (Monograph)
subject
keywords
ethics, Systematic philosophy, conceivability, mereological identity, ontological character, identity, possible worlds, actuality, properties, ontology, object, contingency, apriori, Metaphysical, epistemic, aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, ideology, Systematisk filosofi, etik, estetik, metafysik, kunskapsteori, ideologi, Philosophical logic, Filosofisk logik, logik
pages
183 pages
publisher
Theoretical Philosophy
defense location
Sal 104 Kungshuset Lundagård Lund
defense date
2005-04-09 10:00
ISBN
91-628-6472-6
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
24935
date added to LUP
2007-06-01 09:35:27
date last changed
2012-12-19 13:56:39
@phdthesis{24935,
  abstract     = {I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity (1980). The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm?

My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. The results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general argument of this thesis is sound, then, on this ground, the realist conception of metaphysical essentialism is rejected. The positive thesis of this study is the articulation of certain ways to frame the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori which avoid the problems of realistic essentialism and which suggest a certain transcendental reading of modality.

According to the Kripke Paradigm, any de dicto modal status (of a statement) derives ultimately from the de re modality inherent in the object designated, as the object is characterised by contingent and necessary properties on the ontological level. Thus, the Kripke Paradigm is primarily a thesis in de re realist essentialism.

The final verdict in this study is that the Kripke Paradigm cannot sustain the realistic conception of de re metaphysical essentialism. If we should adopt a transcendental reading of modality, then certain portions of the Kripke Paradigm are valid. I do not delineate or possess the details of a comprehensive doctrine of transcendental metaphysic. Nevertheless, the observations I make should suffice to bring about the rough orientation of how I conceive the notion of transcendental modality.},
  author       = {Theodoridis, Kyriakos},
  isbn         = {91-628-6472-6},
  keyword      = {ethics,Systematic philosophy,conceivability,mereological identity,ontological character,identity,possible worlds,actuality,properties,ontology,object,contingency,apriori,Metaphysical,epistemic,aesthetics,metaphysics,epistemology,ideology,Systematisk filosofi,etik,estetik,metafysik,kunskapsteori,ideologi,Philosophical logic,Filosofisk logik,logik},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {183},
  publisher    = {Theoretical Philosophy},
  school       = {Lund University},
  title        = {Kripke on Necessity : A Metaphysical Investigation},
  year         = {2005},
}