Faith and Hope in Situations of Epistemic Uncertainty
(2019) In Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 55(3). p.319-335- Abstract
- When it comes to religion, lack of conclusive evidence leads many reflective thinkers to embrace agnosticism. However, pure agnosticism does not necessarily have to be the final word; there are other attitudes one might reasonably adopt in a situation of epistemic uncertainty. This article concentrates on J. L. Schellenberg's proposal that non-doxastic propositional faith is available even when belief is unwarranted. Schellenberg's view is rejected since his envisaged notion of faith conflicts with important epistemic aims. Instead, it is suggested that a combination of hope and ‘occasional’ faith constitutes a substantive religious pro-attitude rationally available in situations of epistemic uncertainty.
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https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/2673ffd4-8dab-4482-96b3-a5dfaf154350
- author
- Palmqvist, Carl-Johan LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion
- volume
- 55
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 319 - 335
- publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85046405948
- ISSN
- 0034-4125
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0034412518000239
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 2673ffd4-8dab-4482-96b3-a5dfaf154350
- date added to LUP
- 2018-01-29 10:51:25
- date last changed
- 2022-04-25 05:06:57
@article{2673ffd4-8dab-4482-96b3-a5dfaf154350,
abstract = {{When it comes to religion, lack of conclusive evidence leads many reflective thinkers to embrace agnosticism. However, pure agnosticism does not necessarily have to be the final word; there are other attitudes one might reasonably adopt in a situation of epistemic uncertainty. This article concentrates on J. L. Schellenberg's proposal that non-doxastic propositional faith is available even when belief is unwarranted. Schellenberg's view is rejected since his envisaged notion of faith conflicts with important epistemic aims. Instead, it is suggested that a combination of hope and ‘occasional’ faith constitutes a substantive religious pro-attitude rationally available in situations of epistemic uncertainty.}},
author = {{Palmqvist, Carl-Johan}},
issn = {{0034-4125}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{319--335}},
publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
series = {{Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion}},
title = {{Faith and Hope in Situations of Epistemic Uncertainty}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0034412518000239}},
doi = {{10.1017/S0034412518000239}},
volume = {{55}},
year = {{2019}},
}