Trivial Languages
Båve, Arvid LU
(2018)
In Acta Analytica
33(1).
p.1-17
- Abstract
- I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth (TT), to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT). A specific formulation of (TT) is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I first argue that the facts about speakers’ reactions to such Curry derivations do not constitute a problem for (TT) specifically. Rather, they follow from independent, uncontroversial facts. I then propose... (More)
- I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth (TT), to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT). A specific formulation of (TT) is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I first argue that the facts about speakers’ reactions to such Curry derivations do not constitute a problem for (TT) specifically. Rather, they follow from independent, uncontroversial facts. I then propose a solution which coheres with (TT) as I understand it. Finally, I consider a normative reading of their objection and offer a response. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/283a19e9-7b41-4b6e-a02c-f430ca62ff0b
- author
- Båve, Arvid
LU
- publishing date
- 2018-03-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Acta Analytica
- volume
- 33
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 1 - 17
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85024477866
- ISSN
- 0353-5150
- DOI
- 10.1007/s12136-017-0328-1
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 283a19e9-7b41-4b6e-a02c-f430ca62ff0b
- date added to LUP
- 2021-11-09 11:38:28
- date last changed
- 2023-07-03 04:08:53
@article{283a19e9-7b41-4b6e-a02c-f430ca62ff0b,
abstract = {{I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth (TT), to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT). A specific formulation of (TT) is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I first argue that the facts about speakers’ reactions to such Curry derivations do not constitute a problem for (TT) specifically. Rather, they follow from independent, uncontroversial facts. I then propose a solution which coheres with (TT) as I understand it. Finally, I consider a normative reading of their objection and offer a response.}},
author = {{Båve, Arvid}},
issn = {{0353-5150}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{03}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{1--17}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Acta Analytica}},
title = {{Trivial Languages}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0328-1}},
doi = {{10.1007/s12136-017-0328-1}},
volume = {{33}},
year = {{2018}},
}