We-intentions and immunity to error through misidentification
(2024) In Analysis 84(4). p.758-766- Abstract
- When I intend to J, I may be wrong about what I intend but not about who intends
it. In this sense, action intentions appear immune to error. A standard explanation
of this immunity is that the subject of the intention is not represented in the content
of the intention in the first place. When I think that we intend to J, it seems obvious
that I can misjudge who ‘we’ are. This may seem to indicate that the ‘we’ must be
represented in the content of the intention. This argument from misidentification is
an objection against purely perspectival accounts of the distinction between I- and
we-intentions. However, in several relevant respects we-intentions and I-intentions
are on a par in relation to errors in... (More) - When I intend to J, I may be wrong about what I intend but not about who intends
it. In this sense, action intentions appear immune to error. A standard explanation
of this immunity is that the subject of the intention is not represented in the content
of the intention in the first place. When I think that we intend to J, it seems obvious
that I can misjudge who ‘we’ are. This may seem to indicate that the ‘we’ must be
represented in the content of the intention. This argument from misidentification is
an objection against purely perspectival accounts of the distinction between I- and
we-intentions. However, in several relevant respects we-intentions and I-intentions
are on a par in relation to errors in identification, and the argument from misiden-
tification against the perspectival account of the distinction backfires. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/2f75163b-c091-48bb-8932-ad86037115f4
- author
- Petersson, Björn LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024-09-21
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- collective intentionality, we-intentions, immunity to error in misidentification
- in
- Analysis
- volume
- 84
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 9 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85219143721
- ISSN
- 0003-2638
- DOI
- 10.1093/analys/anae026
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 2f75163b-c091-48bb-8932-ad86037115f4
- date added to LUP
- 2024-02-19 17:30:43
- date last changed
- 2025-04-24 04:01:16
@article{2f75163b-c091-48bb-8932-ad86037115f4,
abstract = {{When I intend to J, I may be wrong about what I intend but not about who intends<br/>it. In this sense, action intentions appear immune to error. A standard explanation<br/>of this immunity is that the subject of the intention is not represented in the content<br/>of the intention in the first place. When I think that we intend to J, it seems obvious<br/>that I can misjudge who ‘we’ are. This may seem to indicate that the ‘we’ must be<br/>represented in the content of the intention. This argument from misidentification is<br/>an objection against purely perspectival accounts of the distinction between I- and<br/>we-intentions. However, in several relevant respects we-intentions and I-intentions<br/>are on a par in relation to errors in identification, and the argument from misiden-<br/>tification against the perspectival account of the distinction backfires.}},
author = {{Petersson, Björn}},
issn = {{0003-2638}},
keywords = {{collective intentionality; we-intentions; immunity to error in misidentification}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{09}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{758--766}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
series = {{Analysis}},
title = {{We-intentions and immunity to error through misidentification}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae026}},
doi = {{10.1093/analys/anae026}},
volume = {{84}},
year = {{2024}},
}