Predicting the shrinking generator with fixed connections
(2003) EUROCRYPT 2003: International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques 2656. p.330-344- Abstract
- We propose a novel distinguishing attack on the shrinking generator with known feedback polynomial for the generating LFSR. The attack can e.g. reliably distinguish a shrinking generator with a weight 4 polynomial of degree as large as 10000, using 2(32) output bits. As the feedback polynomial of an arbitrary LFSR is known to have a polynomial multiple of low weight, our distinguisher applies to arbitrary shrunken LFSR's of moderate length. The analysis can also be used to predict the distribution of blocks in the generated keystream.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/308750
- author
- Ekdahl, Patrik LU ; Meier, W and Johansson, Thomas LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2003
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Advances in Cryptology / Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- volume
- 2656
- pages
- 330 - 344
- publisher
- Springer
- conference name
- EUROCRYPT 2003: International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
- conference location
- Warsaw, Poland
- conference dates
- 2003-05-04 - 2003-05-08
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000183540000020
- scopus:35248859228
- ISSN
- 1611-3349
- 0302-9743
- DOI
- 10.1007/3-540-39200-9_20
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- dd8a1fb3-7ea8-469b-8acc-33bac3b36281 (old id 308750)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 11:40:15
- date last changed
- 2024-10-08 05:25:05
@inproceedings{dd8a1fb3-7ea8-469b-8acc-33bac3b36281, abstract = {{We propose a novel distinguishing attack on the shrinking generator with known feedback polynomial for the generating LFSR. The attack can e.g. reliably distinguish a shrinking generator with a weight 4 polynomial of degree as large as 10000, using 2(32) output bits. As the feedback polynomial of an arbitrary LFSR is known to have a polynomial multiple of low weight, our distinguisher applies to arbitrary shrunken LFSR's of moderate length. The analysis can also be used to predict the distribution of blocks in the generated keystream.}}, author = {{Ekdahl, Patrik and Meier, W and Johansson, Thomas}}, booktitle = {{Advances in Cryptology / Lecture Notes in Computer Science}}, issn = {{1611-3349}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{330--344}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{Predicting the shrinking generator with fixed connections}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_20}}, doi = {{10.1007/3-540-39200-9_20}}, volume = {{2656}}, year = {{2003}}, }