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Value Relations Revisited

Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU (2012) In Economics and Philosophy 28(2). p.133-164
Abstract
In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of 'better', 'worse', 'equally as good as' and 'incomparable in value'. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe these objections can be avoided if one re-interprets the underlying notion of preference: instead of treating preference as a 'dyadic' attitude directed towards a pair of items, we... (More)
In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of 'better', 'worse', 'equally as good as' and 'incomparable in value'. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe these objections can be avoided if one re-interprets the underlying notion of preference: instead of treating preference as a 'dyadic' attitude directed towards a pair of items, we can think of it as a difference of degree between 'monadic' attitudes of favouring. Each such monadic attitude has just one item as its object. Given this re-interpretation, permissible preferences can be modelled by the class of permissible assignments of degrees of favouring to items in the domain. From this construction, we can then recover the old modelling in terms of the class of permissible preference orderings, but the previous objections to that model no longer apply. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Economics and Philosophy
volume
28
issue
2
pages
133 - 164
publisher
Cambridge University Press
external identifiers
  • wos:000308847600002
  • scopus:84865730808
ISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S0266267112000144
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
c4880844-59b4-49d1-abdf-0d236c76f115 (old id 3139788)
date added to LUP
2012-11-26 10:30:22
date last changed
2017-11-19 03:07:39
@article{c4880844-59b4-49d1-abdf-0d236c76f115,
  abstract     = {In Rabinowicz (2008), I considered how value relations can best be analysed in terms of fitting pro-attitudes. In the formal model of that paper, fitting pro-attitudes are represented by the class of permissible preference orderings on a domain of items that are being compared. As it turns out, this approach opens up for a multiplicity of different types of value relationships, along with the standard relations of 'better', 'worse', 'equally as good as' and 'incomparable in value'. Unfortunately, the approach is vulnerable to a number of objections. I believe these objections can be avoided if one re-interprets the underlying notion of preference: instead of treating preference as a 'dyadic' attitude directed towards a pair of items, we can think of it as a difference of degree between 'monadic' attitudes of favouring. Each such monadic attitude has just one item as its object. Given this re-interpretation, permissible preferences can be modelled by the class of permissible assignments of degrees of favouring to items in the domain. From this construction, we can then recover the old modelling in terms of the class of permissible preference orderings, but the previous objections to that model no longer apply.},
  author       = {Rabinowicz, Wlodek},
  issn         = {0266-2671},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {133--164},
  publisher    = {Cambridge University Press},
  series       = {Economics and Philosophy},
  title        = {Value Relations Revisited},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267112000144},
  volume       = {28},
  year         = {2012},
}