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Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU (2012) In Acta Analytica 28(1). p.1-17
Abstract
Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place. While this expansion of the original proposal might seem intuitive, given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless... (More)
Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place. While this expansion of the original proposal might seem intuitive, given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Attitudinal content, Buck-passing account, Dual-role analysis, Fitting-attitude analysis, Motivating reason, Normative reason, Value.
in
Acta Analytica
volume
28
issue
1
pages
1 - 17
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000316012900001
  • scopus:84874797797
ISSN
0353-5150
DOI
10.1007/s12136-012-0181-1
project
On Our Good Reasons
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
487285e2-8742-4f18-a901-21a34a0d128f (old id 3158709)
date added to LUP
2012-12-10 10:57:49
date last changed
2017-01-01 03:52:13
@article{487285e2-8742-4f18-a901-21a34a0d128f,
  abstract     = {Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place. While this expansion of the original proposal might seem intuitive, given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis.},
  author       = {Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni},
  issn         = {0353-5150},
  keyword      = {Attitudinal content,Buck-passing account,Dual-role analysis,Fitting-attitude analysis,Motivating reason,Normative reason,Value.},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {1--17},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Acta Analytica},
  title        = {Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0181-1},
  volume       = {28},
  year         = {2012},
}