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Physical Necessity and Necessity Tout Court.

Masterton, George LU (2012) In Metaphysica 13. p.175-182
Abstract
The very last of words of Naming and Necessity are `The third lecture

suggests that a good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as

mere physical necessity is actually necessary tout court. The question

how far this can be pushed is one I leave for further work.' Kripke (1980).

To my knowledge he never conducted that further work; moreover, no

one following him has wished to take up the baton either. Herein, I argue

that, in general, physical necessity is neither reducible to, nor implies,

tout court necessity. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that even if Kripke's

speculations are restricted to a subset of the physical necessities where it

might be... (More)
The very last of words of Naming and Necessity are `The third lecture

suggests that a good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as

mere physical necessity is actually necessary tout court. The question

how far this can be pushed is one I leave for further work.' Kripke (1980).

To my knowledge he never conducted that further work; moreover, no

one following him has wished to take up the baton either. Herein, I argue

that, in general, physical necessity is neither reducible to, nor implies,

tout court necessity. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that even if Kripke's

speculations are restricted to a subset of the physical necessities where it

might be granted that all such are necessary tout court, physical necessity

is still not reducible to tout court necessity. (Less)
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organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Metaphysica
volume
13
pages
175 - 182
publisher
Springer
ISSN
1437-2053
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
6071e47e-a3b1-4c22-9e54-bffe1e139fc7 (old id 3357882)
date added to LUP
2013-01-11 14:04:56
date last changed
2016-04-15 15:05:35
@article{6071e47e-a3b1-4c22-9e54-bffe1e139fc7,
  abstract     = {The very last of words of Naming and Necessity are `The third lecture<br/><br>
suggests that a good deal of what contemporary philosophy regards as<br/><br>
mere physical necessity is actually necessary tout court. The question<br/><br>
how far this can be pushed is one I leave for further work.' Kripke (1980).<br/><br>
To my knowledge he never conducted that further work; moreover, no<br/><br>
one following him has wished to take up the baton either. Herein, I argue<br/><br>
that, in general, physical necessity is neither reducible to, nor implies,<br/><br>
tout court necessity. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that even if Kripke's<br/><br>
speculations are restricted to a subset of the physical necessities where it<br/><br>
might be granted that all such are necessary tout court, physical necessity<br/><br>
is still not reducible to tout court necessity.},
  author       = {Masterton, George},
  issn         = {1437-2053},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {175--182},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Metaphysica},
  title        = {Physical Necessity and Necessity Tout Court.},
  volume       = {13},
  year         = {2012},
}