Essentially Indexical Higher-Order Thoughts and Dispositions of Inexistent Mental States
(2020) In Filosofiska notiser 7(2). p.45-59- Abstract
- In a recent paper, Miguel Sebastián has posed an objection to the higherorder thought theory of consciousness. The higher-order thought theory of consciousness holds that a mental state is conscious when it is the intentional object of a higher-order thought (HOT). Often, the HOT is conceived to be essentially indexical. This means that the HOT somehow picks out the individual who tokens it. Sebastián argues that the way David Rosenthal conceives of the essential indexicality of higher-order thoughts leads to a vicious regress. The regress is vicious, or so it is argued, because our cognitive capacities cannot cater to infinite strings of HOTs. Therefore, according to Sebastián, the higher-order thought theory fails to provide a... (More)
- In a recent paper, Miguel Sebastián has posed an objection to the higherorder thought theory of consciousness. The higher-order thought theory of consciousness holds that a mental state is conscious when it is the intentional object of a higher-order thought (HOT). Often, the HOT is conceived to be essentially indexical. This means that the HOT somehow picks out the individual who tokens it. Sebastián argues that the way David Rosenthal conceives of the essential indexicality of higher-order thoughts leads to a vicious regress. The regress is vicious, or so it is argued, because our cognitive capacities cannot cater to infinite strings of HOTs. Therefore, according to Sebastián, the higher-order thought theory fails to provide a satisfactory account of consciousness. In this paper, I argue that the way Sebastián sets up the regress argument relies on the implausible view that inexistent mental states have real dispositions on par with the dispositions of ‘real’occurrent mental states. This means that the regress cannot get off the ground. In addition to this, I argue that the fact that there are limits to the cognitive capacities of humans is not in itself an argument against the HOT theory. Despite dismissing Sebastián’s regress argument, I see value in the discussion of the indexicality criterion, and to precipitate this I consider the possibility that the indexicality of HOTs may be transitive, and explore possible ways to ground such a transitive conception of indexicality. (Less)
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- author
- Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Filosofiska notiser
- volume
- 7
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 14 pages
- ISSN
- 2002-0198
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 33987681-b409-43c9-a040-9ef916df4742
- alternative location
- https://filosofiskanotiser.com/FN_20_7_2.htm
- date added to LUP
- 2022-03-18 09:51:14
- date last changed
- 2022-03-18 14:41:41
@article{33987681-b409-43c9-a040-9ef916df4742,
abstract = {{In a recent paper, Miguel Sebastián has posed an objection to the higherorder thought theory of consciousness. The higher-order thought theory of consciousness holds that a mental state is conscious when it is the intentional object of a higher-order thought (HOT). Often, the HOT is conceived to be essentially indexical. This means that the HOT somehow picks out the individual who tokens it. Sebastián argues that the way David Rosenthal conceives of the essential indexicality of higher-order thoughts leads to a vicious regress. The regress is vicious, or so it is argued, because our cognitive capacities cannot cater to infinite strings of HOTs. Therefore, according to Sebastián, the higher-order thought theory fails to provide a satisfactory account of consciousness. In this paper, I argue that the way Sebastián sets up the regress argument relies on the implausible view that inexistent mental states have real dispositions on par with the dispositions of ‘real’occurrent mental states. This means that the regress cannot get off the ground. In addition to this, I argue that the fact that there are limits to the cognitive capacities of humans is not in itself an argument against the HOT theory. Despite dismissing Sebastián’s regress argument, I see value in the discussion of the indexicality criterion, and to precipitate this I consider the possibility that the indexicality of HOTs may be transitive, and explore possible ways to ground such a transitive conception of indexicality.}},
author = {{Kirkeby-Hinrup, Asger}},
issn = {{2002-0198}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{45--59}},
series = {{Filosofiska notiser}},
title = {{Essentially Indexical Higher-Order Thoughts and Dispositions of Inexistent Mental States}},
url = {{https://filosofiskanotiser.com/FN_20_7_2.htm}},
volume = {{7}},
year = {{2020}},
}