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Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame

Talbert, Matthew LU (2013) In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1. p.225-245
Abstract
This chapter argues against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and argues against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view defended, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that an action can appear objectionable to us is that it expresses a judgment with which we disagree about the significance of the interests of those affected by the action. A morally ignorant wrongdoer’s actions may express such judgments even if it is not her fault that she is... (More)
This chapter argues against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and argues against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view defended, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that an action can appear objectionable to us is that it expresses a judgment with which we disagree about the significance of the interests of those affected by the action. A morally ignorant wrongdoer’s actions may express such judgments even if it is not her fault that she is unaware of the moral status of her behavior, and even if it would be unreasonable to expect her to be aware of its status. (Less)
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author
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
host publication
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility
series title
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility
volume
1
pages
225 - 245
publisher
Oxford University Press, New York
ISBN
9780199694860
9780199694853
DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0010
language
English
LU publication?
no
id
35b795d3-3c58-4776-bf5b-a43beda1976a
date added to LUP
2019-05-30 17:53:31
date last changed
2019-08-05 09:41:47
@inbook{35b795d3-3c58-4776-bf5b-a43beda1976a,
  abstract     = {This chapter argues against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and argues against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view defended, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that an action can appear objectionable to us is that it expresses a judgment with which we disagree about the significance of the interests of those affected by the action. A morally ignorant wrongdoer’s actions may express such judgments even if it is not her fault that she is unaware of the moral status of her behavior, and even if it would be unreasonable to expect her to be aware of its status.},
  author       = {Talbert, Matthew},
  booktitle    = {Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility },
  isbn         = {9780199694860},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {225--245},
  publisher    = { Oxford University Press, New York},
  series       = { Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility},
  title        = {Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0010},
  doi          = {10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0010},
  volume       = {1},
  year         = {2013},
}