Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame
(2013) In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1. p.225-245- Abstract
- This chapter argues against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and argues against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view defended, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that an action can appear objectionable to us is that it expresses a judgment with which we disagree about the significance of the interests of those affected by the action. A morally ignorant wrongdoer’s actions may express such judgments even if it is not her fault that she is... (More)
- This chapter argues against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and argues against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view defended, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that an action can appear objectionable to us is that it expresses a judgment with which we disagree about the significance of the interests of those affected by the action. A morally ignorant wrongdoer’s actions may express such judgments even if it is not her fault that she is unaware of the moral status of her behavior, and even if it would be unreasonable to expect her to be aware of its status. (Less)
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https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/35b795d3-3c58-4776-bf5b-a43beda1976a
- author
- Talbert, Matthew LU
- publishing date
- 2013
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility
- series title
- Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility
- volume
- 1
- pages
- 225 - 245
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- ISBN
- 9780199694860
- 9780199694853
- DOI
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0010
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 35b795d3-3c58-4776-bf5b-a43beda1976a
- date added to LUP
- 2019-05-30 17:53:31
- date last changed
- 2020-01-07 13:18:29
@inbook{35b795d3-3c58-4776-bf5b-a43beda1976a,
abstract = {{This chapter argues against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and argues against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view defended, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that an action can appear objectionable to us is that it expresses a judgment with which we disagree about the significance of the interests of those affected by the action. A morally ignorant wrongdoer’s actions may express such judgments even if it is not her fault that she is unaware of the moral status of her behavior, and even if it would be unreasonable to expect her to be aware of its status.}},
author = {{Talbert, Matthew}},
booktitle = {{Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility}},
isbn = {{9780199694860}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{225--245}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
series = {{Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility}},
title = {{Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0010}},
doi = {{10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0010}},
volume = {{1}},
year = {{2013}},
}