Skip to main content

Lund University Publications

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism

Båve, Arvid LU orcid (2017) In Philosophical Quarterly 67(266). p.1-21
Abstract
It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of refutation. I focus particularly on one such theory, which takes concepts to be event types that are individuated by their psychological roles, which has the resources of responding to each of the more specific... (More)
It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of refutation. I focus particularly on one such theory, which takes concepts to be event types that are individuated by their psychological roles, which has the resources of responding to each of the more specific worries Bealer expresses. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
self-consciousness, functionalism, mind-body problem, materialism, conceptual role semantics, inferentialism
in
Philosophical Quarterly
volume
67
issue
266
pages
1 - 21
publisher
Oxford University Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:85014070375
ISSN
0031-8094
DOI
10.1093/pq/pqw029
language
English
LU publication?
no
id
3c2c09d3-c34b-49f4-8669-9e4f76c7ecfc
date added to LUP
2021-11-07 21:50:55
date last changed
2023-06-26 06:38:01
@article{3c2c09d3-c34b-49f4-8669-9e4f76c7ecfc,
  abstract     = {{It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of refutation. I focus particularly on one such theory, which takes concepts to be event types that are individuated by their psychological roles, which has the resources of responding to each of the more specific worries Bealer expresses.}},
  author       = {{Båve, Arvid}},
  issn         = {{0031-8094}},
  keywords     = {{self-consciousness; functionalism; mind-body problem; materialism; conceptual role semantics; inferentialism}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{01}},
  number       = {{266}},
  pages        = {{1--21}},
  publisher    = {{Oxford University Press}},
  series       = {{Philosophical Quarterly}},
  title        = {{Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw029}},
  doi          = {{10.1093/pq/pqw029}},
  volume       = {{67}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}