Varför finns det sådant som inte måste finnas?
(2012) In Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift 88(2). p.89-94- Abstract
- Not only the argument from contingency for the existence of God but also the theistic idea that God is the metaphysical foundation of the world seem to presuppose the intelligibility and validity of the following question: Why is there anything contingent at all? However, it has been argued that, upon closer inspection, this question is a pseudo-question: a question which presupposes illegitimate or somehow ill-founded assumptions. In this article I respond to some of this criticism, especially to that given by David Hume and Adolf Grünbaum. I argue that there seems to be no good reason to think that the question under consideration should not continue to receive proper philosophical attention.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3802116
- author
- Lembke, Martin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2012
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift
- volume
- 88
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 89 - 94
- publisher
- Gleerups Utbildning AB
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84878566310
- ISSN
- 0039-6761
- language
- Swedish
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- The information about affiliations in this record was updated in December 2015. The record was previously connected to the following departments: Centre for Theology and Religious Studies (015017000)
- id
- 3f430360-0fe6-47ed-9dc5-7f1bf7a498eb (old id 3802116)
- alternative location
- http://journals.lub.lu.se/index.php/STK/article/view/7195/5909
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 09:37:36
- date last changed
- 2022-01-29 18:48:42
@article{3f430360-0fe6-47ed-9dc5-7f1bf7a498eb,
abstract = {{Not only the argument from contingency for the existence of God but also the theistic idea that God is the metaphysical foundation of the world seem to presuppose the intelligibility and validity of the following question: Why is there anything contingent at all? However, it has been argued that, upon closer inspection, this question is a pseudo-question: a question which presupposes illegitimate or somehow ill-founded assumptions. In this article I respond to some of this criticism, especially to that given by David Hume and Adolf Grünbaum. I argue that there seems to be no good reason to think that the question under consideration should not continue to receive proper philosophical attention.}},
author = {{Lembke, Martin}},
issn = {{0039-6761}},
language = {{swe}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{89--94}},
publisher = {{Gleerups Utbildning AB}},
series = {{Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift}},
title = {{Varför finns det sådant som inte måste finnas?}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/5374354/3802118.pdf}},
volume = {{88}},
year = {{2012}},
}