Causally Redundant Social Objects: Rejoinder to Elder-Vass
(2014) In Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44(6). p.798-809- Abstract
- In Elder-Vass’s response to my (2014) it is maintained: (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts; (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts; and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification (Elder-Vass forthcoming). In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of... (More)
- In Elder-Vass’s response to my (2014) it is maintained: (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts; (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts; and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification (Elder-Vass forthcoming). In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4245353
- author
- Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2014
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- causal power, critical realism, emergence, mereology, ontological individualism, social structure
- in
- Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- volume
- 44
- issue
- 6
- pages
- 798 - 809
- publisher
- SAGE Publications
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000344683900006
- scopus:84908539794
- ISSN
- 0048-3931
- DOI
- 10.1177/0048393114521364
- project
- Social Ontology and Theories of Persistence
- Metaphysics and Collectivity
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 77af57e8-e4a6-4008-b8f7-6d05643b5258 (old id 4245353)
- alternative location
- http://pos.sagepub.com/content/44/6/798.full.pdf+html
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 09:52:49
- date last changed
- 2022-02-17 04:26:55
@article{77af57e8-e4a6-4008-b8f7-6d05643b5258,
abstract = {{In Elder-Vass’s response to my (2014) it is maintained: (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts; (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts; and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification (Elder-Vass forthcoming). In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers.}},
author = {{Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias}},
issn = {{0048-3931}},
keywords = {{causal power; critical realism; emergence; mereology; ontological individualism; social structure}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{6}},
pages = {{798--809}},
publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
series = {{Philosophy of the Social Sciences}},
title = {{Causally Redundant Social Objects: Rejoinder to Elder-Vass}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/1348131/5050484.pdf}},
doi = {{10.1177/0048393114521364}},
volume = {{44}},
year = {{2014}},
}