Parity and Comparability—a Concern Regarding Chang’s Chaining Argument
(2016) In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(1). p.245-253- Abstract
According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: “better than”, “worse than” and “equally good” do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls “parity”. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates (i.e., that it is indeterminate which of the standard value relations that holds). This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is... (More)
According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: “better than”, “worse than” and “equally good” do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls “parity”. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates (i.e., that it is indeterminate which of the standard value relations that holds). This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is presented. By assuming the Small Unidimensional Difference Principle, which is a key premise for the second part of the argument, Chang’s argument could be accused of begging the question. More so, by assuming this principle, the space for incomparability gets severely limited. If these worries are justified, then Chang’s argument for parity as a fourth form of comparability is unsuccessful.
(Less)
- author
- Andersson, Henrik LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2016-02-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Begging the question, Chang, Comparability, Comparisons, Parity, Trichotomy, Vagueness, Value relations
- in
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- volume
- 19
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 9 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84958749305
- wos:000370815200019
- ISSN
- 1386-2820
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10677-015-9621-5
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 425c759c-dbc3-4e05-9b50-788cba69dc81
- date added to LUP
- 2016-07-08 12:01:14
- date last changed
- 2024-10-04 22:53:51
@article{425c759c-dbc3-4e05-9b50-788cba69dc81,
abstract = {{<p>According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: “better than”, “worse than” and “equally good” do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls “parity”. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates (i.e., that it is indeterminate which of the standard value relations that holds). This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is presented. By assuming the Small Unidimensional Difference Principle, which is a key premise for the second part of the argument, Chang’s argument could be accused of begging the question. More so, by assuming this principle, the space for incomparability gets severely limited. If these worries are justified, then Chang’s argument for parity as a fourth form of comparability is unsuccessful.</p>}},
author = {{Andersson, Henrik}},
issn = {{1386-2820}},
keywords = {{Begging the question; Chang; Comparability; Comparisons; Parity; Trichotomy; Vagueness; Value relations}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{02}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{245--253}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Ethical Theory and Moral Practice}},
title = {{Parity and Comparability—a Concern Regarding Chang’s Chaining Argument}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9621-5}},
doi = {{10.1007/s10677-015-9621-5}},
volume = {{19}},
year = {{2016}},
}