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Aggregation of Value Judgments Differs from Preference Aggregation

Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU (2015) In Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities
Abstract
My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications: The kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of judgments is inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The procedure I have in mind consists in... (More)
My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications: The kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of judgments is inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The procedure I have in mind consists in similarity maximization, or – more precisely – in minimization of the average distance from individual inputs. When applied to judgment aggregation, this procedure can also be approached from the epistemic perspective: the questions are posed concerning its advantages as a truth-tracker. From that perspective, what matters is not only the probability of the outcome of the procedure being true, but also the expected verisimilitude of the outcome: its expected distance from truth. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
in press
subject
keywords
value, preference, ranking, similarity, distance-based methods, aggregation, truth-tracking
in
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities
publisher
Rodopi
ISSN
0303-8157
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
44a5ff0b-6b9b-4917-b14c-fc60c101294f (old id 4935952)
date added to LUP
2015-01-16 08:25:06
date last changed
2016-04-15 14:38:53
@article{44a5ff0b-6b9b-4917-b14c-fc60c101294f,
  abstract     = {My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications: The kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of judgments is inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The procedure I have in mind consists in similarity maximization, or – more precisely – in minimization of the average distance from individual inputs. When applied to judgment aggregation, this procedure can also be approached from the epistemic perspective: the questions are posed concerning its advantages as a truth-tracker. From that perspective, what matters is not only the probability of the outcome of the procedure being true, but also the expected verisimilitude of the outcome: its expected distance from truth.},
  author       = {Rabinowicz, Wlodek},
  issn         = {0303-8157},
  keyword      = {value,preference,ranking,similarity,distance-based methods,aggregation,truth-tracking},
  language     = {eng},
  publisher    = {Rodopi},
  series       = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities},
  title        = {Aggregation of Value Judgments Differs from Preference Aggregation},
  year         = {2015},
}