Threshold Insurance Voting in PR Systems: A Study of Voters’ Strategic Behavior in the 2010 Swedish General Election
(2014) In Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties 24(4). p.473-492- Abstract
- This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the... (More)
- This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the Christian Democrats which was included in the incumbent government coalition. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4589549
- author
- Fredén, Annika LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2014
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- thresholds, coalitions, voting, strategic, PR systems
- in
- Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties
- volume
- 24
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 473 - 492
- publisher
- Routledge
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84903154418
- ISSN
- 1745-7297
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- a2668917-f81b-4e1b-9362-6e1f85463340 (old id 4589549)
- alternative location
- http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2013.872118#.U_RwymOmogx
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 10:10:57
- date last changed
- 2022-04-12 02:50:40
@article{a2668917-f81b-4e1b-9362-6e1f85463340,
abstract = {{This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the Christian Democrats which was included in the incumbent government coalition.}},
author = {{Fredén, Annika}},
issn = {{1745-7297}},
keywords = {{thresholds; coalitions; voting; strategic; PR systems}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{473--492}},
publisher = {{Routledge}},
series = {{Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties}},
title = {{Threshold Insurance Voting in PR Systems: A Study of Voters’ Strategic Behavior in the 2010 Swedish General Election}},
url = {{http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2013.872118#.U_RwymOmogx}},
volume = {{24}},
year = {{2014}},
}