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Threshold Insurance Voting in PR Systems: A Study of Voters’ Strategic Behavior in the 2010 Swedish General Election

Fredén, Annika LU (2014) In Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties 24(4). p.473-492
Abstract
This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the... (More)
This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the Christian Democrats which was included in the incumbent government coalition. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
thresholds, coalitions, voting, strategic, PR systems
in
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties
volume
24
issue
4
pages
473 - 492
publisher
Routledge
external identifiers
  • scopus:84903154418
ISSN
1745-7297
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
a2668917-f81b-4e1b-9362-6e1f85463340 (old id 4589549)
alternative location
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2013.872118#.U_RwymOmogx
date added to LUP
2014-08-20 13:34:12
date last changed
2017-10-08 03:06:52
@article{a2668917-f81b-4e1b-9362-6e1f85463340,
  abstract     = {This study investigates strategic voting for small parties in proportional representation systems, in previous work sometimes referred to as threshold insurance voting (Cox, 1997). Starting from theories of rational voting (Downs, 1957), three conditions for threshold insurance voting are developed: the voter considers potential government outcomes, votes for a party at risk of falling below an electoral threshold, and votes for another party than his or her most preferred one. The conditions are tested on the case of the 2010 Swedish general election. Using extensive data material and a conditional logit model of vote choice, the results show that in this election voters cast strategic votes for at least one of the small parties, the Christian Democrats which was included in the incumbent government coalition.},
  author       = {Fredén, Annika},
  issn         = {1745-7297},
  keyword      = {thresholds,coalitions,voting,strategic,PR systems},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {473--492},
  publisher    = {Routledge},
  series       = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties},
  title        = {Threshold Insurance Voting in PR Systems: A Study of Voters’ Strategic Behavior in the 2010 Swedish General Election},
  volume       = {24},
  year         = {2014},
}