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Tarski’s one and only concept of truth

Smid, Jeroen LU (2014) In Synthese 191(14). p.3393-3406
Abstract
In a recent article, David (Tarski’s convention T and the concept of truth, pp. 133–156, 2008) distinguishes between two interpretations of Tarski’s work on truth. The standard interpretation has it that Tarski gave us a definition of truth in-L within the meta-language; the non-standard interpretation, that Tarski did not give

us a definition of true sentence in L, but rather a definition of truth, and Tarski does so for L within the metalanguage.

The difference is crucial: for on the standard view, there are different concepts of truth, while in the alternative interpretation there is just one concept. In this paper we will have a brief look at the distinction between these two interpretations and at the arguments David... (More)
In a recent article, David (Tarski’s convention T and the concept of truth, pp. 133–156, 2008) distinguishes between two interpretations of Tarski’s work on truth. The standard interpretation has it that Tarski gave us a definition of truth in-L within the meta-language; the non-standard interpretation, that Tarski did not give

us a definition of true sentence in L, but rather a definition of truth, and Tarski does so for L within the metalanguage.

The difference is crucial: for on the standard view, there are different concepts of truth, while in the alternative interpretation there is just one concept. In this paper we will have a brief look at the distinction between these two interpretations and at the arguments David gives for each view. We will evaluate one of David’s arguments for the alternative view by looking at Tarski’s ‘On the concept of truth in formalized languages’ (CTF), and his use of the term ‘extension’ therein, which, we shall find, yields no conclusive evidence for either position. Then we will look at how Tarski treats ‘satisfaction’, an essential concept for his definition of ‘true sentence’. It will be argued that, in light of how Tarski talks about ‘satisfaction’ in Sect. 4 of ‘CTF’ and his claims in the Postscript, the alternative view is more likely than the standard one. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Satisfaction, True-in-L, Truth, Tarski
in
Synthese
volume
191
issue
14
pages
3393 - 3406
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • wos:000340086500012
  • scopus:84905392772
ISSN
0039-7857
DOI
10.1007/s11229-014-0450-1
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
b5f8a9bb-3980-4780-8d83-fac3056502a8 (old id 4616547)
date added to LUP
2014-09-02 14:07:10
date last changed
2017-01-01 03:00:50
@article{b5f8a9bb-3980-4780-8d83-fac3056502a8,
  abstract     = {In a recent article, David (Tarski’s convention T and the concept of truth, pp. 133–156, 2008) distinguishes between two interpretations of Tarski’s work on truth. The standard interpretation has it that Tarski gave us a definition of truth in-L within the meta-language; the non-standard interpretation, that Tarski did not give<br/><br>
us a definition of true sentence in L, but rather a definition of truth, and Tarski does so for L within the metalanguage.<br/><br>
The difference is crucial: for on the standard view, there are different concepts of truth, while in the alternative interpretation there is just one concept. In this paper we will have a brief look at the distinction between these two interpretations and at the arguments David gives for each view. We will evaluate one of David’s arguments for the alternative view by looking at Tarski’s ‘On the concept of truth in formalized languages’ (CTF), and his use of the term ‘extension’ therein, which, we shall find, yields no conclusive evidence for either position. Then we will look at how Tarski treats ‘satisfaction’, an essential concept for his definition of ‘true sentence’. It will be argued that, in light of how Tarski talks about ‘satisfaction’ in Sect. 4 of ‘CTF’ and his claims in the Postscript, the alternative view is more likely than the standard one.},
  author       = {Smid, Jeroen},
  issn         = {0039-7857},
  keyword      = {Satisfaction,True-in-L,Truth,Tarski},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {14},
  pages        = {3393--3406},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Synthese},
  title        = {Tarski’s one and only concept of truth},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0450-1},
  volume       = {191},
  year         = {2014},
}