Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body
Blomberg, Olle LU
(2021)
In Mind & Language
36(2).
p.264-284
- Abstract
- According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action. It does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher-order interlocking intentions.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/462b65fe-9825-46a4-9d69-9c4ccca85858
- author
- Blomberg, Olle
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2021-04-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Intentional cooperation, group-identification, joint commitment, shared cooperative intention, team reasoning, joint intentional action
- in
- Mind & Language
- volume
- 36
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 21 pages
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85078805822
- ISSN
- 0268-1064
- DOI
- 10.1111/mila.12274
- project
- The Nature of Intentional Joint Action: Coordination, Responsibility and Participant ́s Knowledge
- Metaphysics and Collectivity
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 462b65fe-9825-46a4-9d69-9c4ccca85858
- date added to LUP
- 2019-10-14 23:38:08
- date last changed
- 2022-04-18 18:19:33
@article{462b65fe-9825-46a4-9d69-9c4ccca85858,
abstract = {{According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this <i>notional singularization move</i> fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action. It does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher-order interlocking intentions.}},
author = {{Blomberg, Olle}},
issn = {{0268-1064}},
keywords = {{Intentional cooperation; group-identification; joint commitment; shared cooperative intention; team reasoning; joint intentional action}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{04}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{264--284}},
publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
series = {{Mind & Language}},
title = {{Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/71111223/Blomberg_Intentional_cooperation.pdf}},
doi = {{10.1111/mila.12274}},
volume = {{36}},
year = {{2021}},
}