Group Morality and Moral Groups : Ethical Aspects of the Tuomelian We-Mode
(2023) In Philosophers in Depth p.201-218- Abstract
- Raimo Tuomela’s we-mode groups are partly characterized by norms. Some norms may be characteristic of all we-mode groups, like the norm restricting a member's right to leave the group. Some think that this aspect of Tuomela’s theory has implausible ethical implications concerning the rights and autonomy of members in we-mode groups. That worry vanishes, I argue, on a plausible interpretation of Tuomela’s notion of social normativity and a reasonable precisification of the notion of autonomy in this context. On the other hand, Tuomela’s general silence on the nature of moral normativity makes it unclear how his distinction between social and moral normativity should be drawn more precisely. Is this a difference in kind, or merely a... (More)
- Raimo Tuomela’s we-mode groups are partly characterized by norms. Some norms may be characteristic of all we-mode groups, like the norm restricting a member's right to leave the group. Some think that this aspect of Tuomela’s theory has implausible ethical implications concerning the rights and autonomy of members in we-mode groups. That worry vanishes, I argue, on a plausible interpretation of Tuomela’s notion of social normativity and a reasonable precisification of the notion of autonomy in this context. On the other hand, Tuomela’s general silence on the nature of moral normativity makes it unclear how his distinction between social and moral normativity should be drawn more precisely. Is this a difference in kind, or merely a difference in the scope or social basis of the norms in question? I find this worth exploring with the aid of resources available within a broadly Tuomelian framework. Like Jeremy Koons (2019), I believe that Tuomela's framework could be used to refine Wilfrid Sellars theory of ethical judgments as expressions of we-intentions. My preferred interpretation of Tuomela differs from Koons' though, and so does the resulting reconstruction of Sellars, which is more Humean than Kantian. (Less)
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https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/469490e4-5001-411b-843a-fbf62bcb7b77
- author
- Petersson, Björn LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Group morality, We-mode groups, Social normativity, Moral normativity, We-intentions, Collective intentionality
- host publication
- Tuomela on Sociality
- series title
- Philosophers in Depth
- editor
- Garcia-Godinez, Miguel and Mellin, Rachael
- pages
- 18 pages
- publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan
- ISSN
- 2947-552X
- 2947-5538
- ISBN
- 978-3-031-22625-0
- 978-3-031-22628-1
- 978-3-031-22626-7
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7_10
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 469490e4-5001-411b-843a-fbf62bcb7b77
- date added to LUP
- 2023-02-20 14:56:23
- date last changed
- 2023-05-23 12:31:29
@inbook{469490e4-5001-411b-843a-fbf62bcb7b77, abstract = {{Raimo Tuomela’s we-mode groups are partly characterized by norms. Some norms may be characteristic of all we-mode groups, like the norm restricting a member's right to leave the group. Some think that this aspect of Tuomela’s theory has implausible ethical implications concerning the rights and autonomy of members in we-mode groups. That worry vanishes, I argue, on a plausible interpretation of Tuomela’s notion of social normativity and a reasonable precisification of the notion of autonomy in this context. On the other hand, Tuomela’s general silence on the nature of moral normativity makes it unclear how his distinction between social and moral normativity should be drawn more precisely. Is this a difference in kind, or merely a difference in the scope or social basis of the norms in question? I find this worth exploring with the aid of resources available within a broadly Tuomelian framework. Like Jeremy Koons (2019), I believe that Tuomela's framework could be used to refine Wilfrid Sellars theory of ethical judgments as expressions of we-intentions. My preferred interpretation of Tuomela differs from Koons' though, and so does the resulting reconstruction of Sellars, which is more Humean than Kantian.}}, author = {{Petersson, Björn}}, booktitle = {{Tuomela on Sociality}}, editor = {{Garcia-Godinez, Miguel and Mellin, Rachael}}, isbn = {{978-3-031-22625-0}}, issn = {{2947-552X}}, keywords = {{Group morality; We-mode groups; Social normativity; Moral normativity; We-intentions; Collective intentionality}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{201--218}}, publisher = {{Palgrave Macmillan}}, series = {{Philosophers in Depth}}, title = {{Group Morality and Moral Groups : Ethical Aspects of the Tuomelian We-Mode}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7_10}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7_10}}, year = {{2023}}, }