Non-Cognitivism and Validity
(2007) In Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy 73(2). p.121-147- Abstract
- In this paper I defend against a certain objection the view that it is possible to account for validity and kindred notions for moral language within a non-cognitivist framework by appeal to the descriptive meaning of moral terms. The objection is that such an account leads to an asymmetry in the accounts it offers for synonymy in different contexts; in certain contexts it holds that sameness of meaning for a moral term depends on its evaluative meaning, in other contexts that it depends on the term's descriptive meaning. In the third part of the paper I try to show why non-cognitivists should be prepared to live with that asymmetry. In the process I also deal with two other objections.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/737967
- author
- Alm, David LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2007
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- validity, descriptive meaning, Non-cognitivism, inference, attitudes
- in
- Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy
- volume
- 73
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 121 - 147
- publisher
- Thales
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000257240900003
- scopus:77949370517
- ISSN
- 0040-5825
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 4840f0fc-8bb6-4827-bbf2-a799358c5ff6 (old id 737967)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 16:10:52
- date last changed
- 2022-01-28 17:50:07
@article{4840f0fc-8bb6-4827-bbf2-a799358c5ff6,
abstract = {{In this paper I defend against a certain objection the view that it is possible to account for validity and kindred notions for moral language within a non-cognitivist framework by appeal to the descriptive meaning of moral terms. The objection is that such an account leads to an asymmetry in the accounts it offers for synonymy in different contexts; in certain contexts it holds that sameness of meaning for a moral term depends on its evaluative meaning, in other contexts that it depends on the term's descriptive meaning. In the third part of the paper I try to show why non-cognitivists should be prepared to live with that asymmetry. In the process I also deal with two other objections.}},
author = {{Alm, David}},
issn = {{0040-5825}},
keywords = {{validity; descriptive meaning; Non-cognitivism; inference; attitudes}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{121--147}},
publisher = {{Thales}},
series = {{Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy}},
title = {{Non-Cognitivism and Validity}},
volume = {{73}},
year = {{2007}},
}