Aggregation of value judgments differs from aggregation of preferences
(2016) In Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities p.9-40- Abstract
- My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications: The kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of judgments is inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The procedure I have in mind consists in... (More)
- My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications: The kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of judgments is inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The procedure I have in mind consists in similarity maximization, or – more precisely – in minimization of the average distance from individual inputs. When applied to judgment aggregation, this procedure can also be approached from the epistemic perspective: the questions are posed concerning its advantages as a truth-tracker. From that perspective, what matters is not only the probability of the outcome of the procedure being true, but also the expected verisimilitude of the outcome: its expected distance from truth. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4935952
- author
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2016
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- value, preference, ranking, similarity, distance-based methods, aggregation, truth-tracking
- host publication
- ncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy
- series title
- Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities
- pages
- 9 - 40
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85055660906
- ISSN
- 0303-8157
- ISBN
- 978-900431910-3
- 978-90-04-31265-4
- DOI
- 10.1163/9789004312654_003
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 44a5ff0b-6b9b-4917-b14c-fc60c101294f (old id 4935952)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 10:08:24
- date last changed
- 2025-01-10 01:59:38
@inbook{44a5ff0b-6b9b-4917-b14c-fc60c101294f,
abstract = {{My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications: The kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of judgments is inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The procedure I have in mind consists in similarity maximization, or – more precisely – in minimization of the average distance from individual inputs. When applied to judgment aggregation, this procedure can also be approached from the epistemic perspective: the questions are posed concerning its advantages as a truth-tracker. From that perspective, what matters is not only the probability of the outcome of the procedure being true, but also the expected verisimilitude of the outcome: its expected distance from truth.}},
author = {{Rabinowicz, Wlodek}},
booktitle = {{ncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy}},
isbn = {{978-900431910-3}},
issn = {{0303-8157}},
keywords = {{value; preference; ranking; similarity; distance-based methods; aggregation; truth-tracking}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{9--40}},
series = {{Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}},
title = {{Aggregation of value judgments differs from aggregation of preferences}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004312654_003}},
doi = {{10.1163/9789004312654_003}},
year = {{2016}},
}