Varför bildas nya partier? : Om kollektivt handlande och partientreprenörer
(2005) In Lund Political Studies- Abstract
- Since political parties are collective goods, groups of people that demand new political parties face a collective action problem. Therefore, we can speak of a ?paradox of party-emergence?. Hence, it is puzzling that new parties became increasingly common in representative bodies at the Swedish local level during 1973?2002. This development provides a unique circumstance on which to test hypotheses on how, when and why collective action problems are solved. Adhering to the principle of methodological individualism, and using rational choice as point of departure, I set out to answer two research-questions: (1) Why do people create parties in the first place? (2) Why did party-creation become an increasingly popular political strategy... (More)
- Since political parties are collective goods, groups of people that demand new political parties face a collective action problem. Therefore, we can speak of a ?paradox of party-emergence?. Hence, it is puzzling that new parties became increasingly common in representative bodies at the Swedish local level during 1973?2002. This development provides a unique circumstance on which to test hypotheses on how, when and why collective action problems are solved. Adhering to the principle of methodological individualism, and using rational choice as point of departure, I set out to answer two research-questions: (1) Why do people create parties in the first place? (2) Why did party-creation become an increasingly popular political strategy between 1973 and 2002 in Swedish municipalities? I begin this venture by reviewing the existing literature in the field. I criticize and reject unsatisfactory approaches of party-emergence, and conversely retain and develop valuable approaches. Ultimately, three (complementary) approaches are constructed in order to answer the research-questions: The Parametric Model, The Sequential Model and The Dynamic Model. (1) ?The Parametric Model? uses the standard economic methodology of rational choice. Actors are assumed to be motivated by money, power or prestige, and they are also assumed to possess complete information about the relevant parameters. I hypothesize that changes in the potential party-entrepreneurs? relevant environment have boosted the net-benefits of party-creation, thus explaining why party-creation became an increasingly popular strategy during 1973?2002. Empirical evidence, however, does not support this assertion. Worse still, some environmental changes point in the opposite direction, which deepens the paradox of party-emergence. Then, (2) ?The Sequential Model? is constructed in order to move the analysis closer to the individual party-entrepreneurs. By modeling the sequences preceding the entrepreneurs? decision, and using this model to process-trace six cases ? chosen through the ?method of difference? ? of party-emergence, I set out to identify mechanisms that trigger party-emergence. Results indicate that ?strong emotions? such as anger and psychological incentives such as lust for revenge, mobilize actors to overcome costs and engage in high-cost political activities. ?Strong emotions? only provide an answer to the first question, but do not explain the emergence of new parties between 1973 and 2002. Hence, (3) ?The Dynamic Model? is constructed, which sets out to answer why party-creation became an increasingly popular strategy during the period 1973?2002. I analytically construct a hypothesis built on the assumption that a mechanism called ?rational imitation? is responsible for the fact that new parties became common in Swedish municipalities. The core argument is as follows: the fact that an entrepreneur creates a political party at t ? 1 inspires potential entrepreneurs in neighboring municipalities to create parties at later points in time. Although results only reveal weak evidence to support this hypothesis, the correlations cannot be ignored. In fact, since previous attempts to explain the increasing number of new parties in Sweden have been unsuccessful, and since face-to-face contacts no longer are assumed to be significant, these results are judged as the most promising for answering the second research-question. (Less)
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Popular Abstract in Swedish
Eftersom politiska partier är kollektiva varor står potentiella partibildare inför det kollektiva handlandets problem. Därför kan vi tala om en "partibildningsparadox". Sålunda är det förvånande att icke riksdagsetablerade partier blev vanligare förekommande i svenska kommuner mellan 1973 och 2002. Utvecklingen ger oss ett unikt material på vilket vi kan pröva hypoteser om hur, när och varför så kallade "samarbetsparadoxer" upplöses. Med avstamp i principen om metodologisk individualism och antaganden om individuell rationalitet, är avhandlingens ambition att besvara två forskningsfrågor: (1) Varför bestämmer sig människor för att bilda nya partier överhuvudtaget? (2) Varför blev nya partier allt... (More) - Popular Abstract in Swedish
Eftersom politiska partier är kollektiva varor står potentiella partibildare inför det kollektiva handlandets problem. Därför kan vi tala om en "partibildningsparadox". Sålunda är det förvånande att icke riksdagsetablerade partier blev vanligare förekommande i svenska kommuner mellan 1973 och 2002. Utvecklingen ger oss ett unikt material på vilket vi kan pröva hypoteser om hur, när och varför så kallade "samarbetsparadoxer" upplöses. Med avstamp i principen om metodologisk individualism och antaganden om individuell rationalitet, är avhandlingens ambition att besvara två forskningsfrågor: (1) Varför bestämmer sig människor för att bilda nya partier överhuvudtaget? (2) Varför blev nya partier allt banligare förekommande i svenska kommuner under åren 1973-2002? Jag inleder med att inventera den existerande litteraturen på området, där jag kritiserar och sorterar bort sådant som inte bedöms vara värdefullt för att uppnå mina syften, och omvänt väljer ut värdefulla angreppssätt. Slutligen konstrueras tre separata modeller som ska hjälpa mig kasta ett ljus över mina forskningsfrågor: Den parametriska modellen, Den sekventiella modellen och den dynamiska modellen. (1) Den parametriska modellen använder den ekonomiska skolbildningens standardmetodologi. Partibildarna antas motiveras av pengar, makt eller prestige, och de antas besitta fullständig information om de relevanta parametrarna. Här ställs frågan om förändringar i den potentiella partibildarens omgivning har gjort det mer lockande att vilja bilda nya partier. De empiriska bevisen tillbakavisar en sådan hypotes. Tvärtom pekar flertalet indikatorer i motsatt riktning. Därför konstrueras (2) den sekventiella modellen, där poängen är att komma närmare de individuella partibildarnas motiv. Fallstudieresultaten indikerar att så kallade "heta känslor" som vrede och revanschlust kan mobilisera människor till politisk handling. Bekymret är att de heta känslorna enbart förklarar varför en individ skulle vilja bilda ett parti, men säger oss ingenting om makrofrågan, varför nya partier blev generellt vanligare mellan 1973-2002. Därför konstrueras (3) den dynamiska modellen som försöker kasta ett ljus över frågan varför partibildningsstrategin ökade i popularitet under de senaste tre decennierna. Här konstrueras en hypotes som stipulerar att "rationell imitation" ansvarar för utvecklingen. Kärnargumentet lyder som följer: att en entreprenör bildar ett parti vid en viss tidpunkt inspirerar potentiella partibildare i grannkommuner att bilda partier vid senare tidpunkter. Trots att hypotesen bara får ett svagt stöd, är stödet den får intressant, beroende på att tidigare försök att förklara utvecklingen inte varit framgångsrika. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/24416
- author
- Erlingsson, Gissur LU
- supervisor
- opponent
-
- Professor Strom, Kaare, Department of Political Science, UCSD, USA
- organization
- publishing date
- 2005
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Social sciences, Swedish Municipalities, Rational Imitation, Emotions and Rationality, Entrepreneurs, Rational Choice, Methodological Individualism, Paradox of Participation, New Political Parties, Collective Action, Political and administrative sciences, Samhällsvetenskaper, Statsvetenskap, förvaltningskunskap
- in
- Lund Political Studies
- issue
- 141
- pages
- 326 pages
- publisher
- Department of Political Science, Lund University
- defense location
- Edens hörsal, 1 våningen, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen.
- defense date
- 2005-09-17 10:15:00
- ISSN
- 0460-0037
- ISBN
- 91-88306-53-4
- language
- Swedish
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 49ba0a88-6a99-4da8-b8ec-a5a0106cafb4 (old id 24416)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 16:11:57
- date last changed
- 2019-07-03 20:08:43
@phdthesis{49ba0a88-6a99-4da8-b8ec-a5a0106cafb4,
abstract = {{Since political parties are collective goods, groups of people that demand new political parties face a collective action problem. Therefore, we can speak of a ?paradox of party-emergence?. Hence, it is puzzling that new parties became increasingly common in representative bodies at the Swedish local level during 1973?2002. This development provides a unique circumstance on which to test hypotheses on how, when and why collective action problems are solved. Adhering to the principle of methodological individualism, and using rational choice as point of departure, I set out to answer two research-questions: (1) Why do people create parties in the first place? (2) Why did party-creation become an increasingly popular political strategy between 1973 and 2002 in Swedish municipalities? I begin this venture by reviewing the existing literature in the field. I criticize and reject unsatisfactory approaches of party-emergence, and conversely retain and develop valuable approaches. Ultimately, three (complementary) approaches are constructed in order to answer the research-questions: The Parametric Model, The Sequential Model and The Dynamic Model. (1) ?The Parametric Model? uses the standard economic methodology of rational choice. Actors are assumed to be motivated by money, power or prestige, and they are also assumed to possess complete information about the relevant parameters. I hypothesize that changes in the potential party-entrepreneurs? relevant environment have boosted the net-benefits of party-creation, thus explaining why party-creation became an increasingly popular strategy during 1973?2002. Empirical evidence, however, does not support this assertion. Worse still, some environmental changes point in the opposite direction, which deepens the paradox of party-emergence. Then, (2) ?The Sequential Model? is constructed in order to move the analysis closer to the individual party-entrepreneurs. By modeling the sequences preceding the entrepreneurs? decision, and using this model to process-trace six cases ? chosen through the ?method of difference? ? of party-emergence, I set out to identify mechanisms that trigger party-emergence. Results indicate that ?strong emotions? such as anger and psychological incentives such as lust for revenge, mobilize actors to overcome costs and engage in high-cost political activities. ?Strong emotions? only provide an answer to the first question, but do not explain the emergence of new parties between 1973 and 2002. Hence, (3) ?The Dynamic Model? is constructed, which sets out to answer why party-creation became an increasingly popular strategy during the period 1973?2002. I analytically construct a hypothesis built on the assumption that a mechanism called ?rational imitation? is responsible for the fact that new parties became common in Swedish municipalities. The core argument is as follows: the fact that an entrepreneur creates a political party at t ? 1 inspires potential entrepreneurs in neighboring municipalities to create parties at later points in time. Although results only reveal weak evidence to support this hypothesis, the correlations cannot be ignored. In fact, since previous attempts to explain the increasing number of new parties in Sweden have been unsuccessful, and since face-to-face contacts no longer are assumed to be significant, these results are judged as the most promising for answering the second research-question.}},
author = {{Erlingsson, Gissur}},
isbn = {{91-88306-53-4}},
issn = {{0460-0037}},
keywords = {{Social sciences; Swedish Municipalities; Rational Imitation; Emotions and Rationality; Entrepreneurs; Rational Choice; Methodological Individualism; Paradox of Participation; New Political Parties; Collective Action; Political and administrative sciences; Samhällsvetenskaper; Statsvetenskap; förvaltningskunskap}},
language = {{swe}},
number = {{141}},
publisher = {{Department of Political Science, Lund University}},
school = {{Lund University}},
series = {{Lund Political Studies}},
title = {{Varför bildas nya partier? : Om kollektivt handlande och partientreprenörer}},
year = {{2005}},
}