From Simple to Composite Agency : On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural Agency
Blomberg, Olle LU
(2019)
In Journal of Social Ontology
5(1).
p.101-124
- Abstract
- According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. Hence, individ- ual action and collective action are ontologically on a par. Ludwig also exaggerates the contrast between individual and collective action by introducing a “sole agency... (More)
- According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. Hence, individ- ual action and collective action are ontologically on a par. Ludwig also exaggerates the contrast between individual and collective action by introducing a “sole agency requirement” in his account of the semantics of singular action sentences. However, sole agency is merely typically pragmatically implicated by singular action sentences, not entailed by them. If I say, “I turned on the light”, after we each flipped one of two switches that together turned on the light, then I might be misleading the audience, but what I say is true. Finally, I argue that, contra Ludwig, individuals often have “I-intentions” to bring about an event that can be satisfied even if there are co-agents who bring about the event in the same way. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4abfbf66-060e-4359-a4b9-d2e8b5c463a5
- author
- Blomberg, Olle
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Primitive action, Composite action, Collective action, Action sentences, I-intention, Kirk Ludwig, Ontology of action
- in
- Journal of Social Ontology
- volume
- 5
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 24 pages
- publisher
- De Gruyter
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85076299171
- ISSN
- 2196-9663
- DOI
- 10.1515/jso-2019-0023
- project
- The Nature of Intentional Joint Action: Coordination, Responsibility and Participant ́s Knowledge
- Metaphysics and Collectivity
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 4abfbf66-060e-4359-a4b9-d2e8b5c463a5
- date added to LUP
- 2019-11-23 15:02:40
- date last changed
- 2022-04-18 19:12:23
@article{4abfbf66-060e-4359-a4b9-d2e8b5c463a5,
abstract = {{According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. Hence, individ- ual action and collective action are ontologically on a par. Ludwig also exaggerates the contrast between individual and collective action by introducing a “sole agency requirement” in his account of the semantics of singular action sentences. However, sole agency is merely typically pragmatically implicated by singular action sentences, not entailed by them. If I say, “I turned on the light”, after we each flipped one of two switches that together turned on the light, then I might be misleading the audience, but what I say is true. Finally, I argue that, contra Ludwig, individuals often have “I-intentions” to bring about an event that can be satisfied even if there are co-agents who bring about the event in the same way.}},
author = {{Blomberg, Olle}},
issn = {{2196-9663}},
keywords = {{Primitive action; Composite action; Collective action; Action sentences; I-intention; Kirk Ludwig; Ontology of action}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{101--124}},
publisher = {{De Gruyter}},
series = {{Journal of Social Ontology}},
title = {{From Simple to Composite Agency : On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural Agency}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0023}},
doi = {{10.1515/jso-2019-0023}},
volume = {{5}},
year = {{2019}},
}