Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor's Theorem
(2013) In Forum Philosophicum 17(2). p.211-223- Abstract
- Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.
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- author
- Lembke, Martin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2013
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Cantor's Theorem, Patrick Grim, Omniscience, Self-Referential Incoherence, Set Theoretical Paradoxes
- in
- Forum Philosophicum
- volume
- 17
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 211 - 223
- publisher
- Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie
- ISSN
- 1426-1898
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- The information about affiliations in this record was updated in December 2015. The record was previously connected to the following departments: Centre for Theology and Religious Studies (015017000)
- id
- 4cab91c4-7e46-4848-9fb9-d0c984ca14ff (old id 3972574)
- alternative location
- http://ignatianum.edu.pl/files/fphilosophicum/Forum_Philosophicum_2012_25_Martin_Lembke.pdf
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 13:39:22
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 13:51:38
@article{4cab91c4-7e46-4848-9fb9-d0c984ca14ff, abstract = {{Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.}}, author = {{Lembke, Martin}}, issn = {{1426-1898}}, keywords = {{Cantor's Theorem; Patrick Grim; Omniscience; Self-Referential Incoherence; Set Theoretical Paradoxes}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{211--223}}, publisher = {{Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie}}, series = {{Forum Philosophicum}}, title = {{Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor's Theorem}}, url = {{http://ignatianum.edu.pl/files/fphilosophicum/Forum_Philosophicum_2012_25_Martin_Lembke.pdf}}, volume = {{17}}, year = {{2013}}, }