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Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor's Theorem

Lembke, Martin LU (2013) In Forum Philosophicum 17(2). p.211-223
Abstract
Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Cantor's Theorem, Patrick Grim, Omniscience, Self-Referential Incoherence, Set Theoretical Paradoxes
in
Forum Philosophicum
volume
17
issue
2
pages
211 - 223
publisher
Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie
ISSN
1426-1898
language
English
LU publication?
yes
additional info
The information about affiliations in this record was updated in December 2015. The record was previously connected to the following departments: Centre for Theology and Religious Studies (015017000)
id
4cab91c4-7e46-4848-9fb9-d0c984ca14ff (old id 3972574)
alternative location
http://ignatianum.edu.pl/files/fphilosophicum/Forum_Philosophicum_2012_25_Martin_Lembke.pdf
date added to LUP
2016-04-01 13:39:22
date last changed
2025-04-04 13:51:38
@article{4cab91c4-7e46-4848-9fb9-d0c984ca14ff,
  abstract     = {{Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscience is sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.}},
  author       = {{Lembke, Martin}},
  issn         = {{1426-1898}},
  keywords     = {{Cantor's Theorem; Patrick Grim; Omniscience; Self-Referential Incoherence; Set Theoretical Paradoxes}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{211--223}},
  publisher    = {{Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie}},
  series       = {{Forum Philosophicum}},
  title        = {{Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor's Theorem}},
  url          = {{http://ignatianum.edu.pl/files/fphilosophicum/Forum_Philosophicum_2012_25_Martin_Lembke.pdf}},
  volume       = {{17}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}