A Logic-Based Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance
(2012) p.67-80- Abstract
- ``Pluralistic ignorance'' is a phenomenon mainly studied in social psychology. Viewed as an epistemic phenomenon, one way to define it is as a situation where ``no one believes, but everyone believes that everyone else believes''. In this paper various versions of pluralistic ignorance are formalized using epistemic/doxastic logic (based on plausibility models). The motive is twofold. Firstly, the formalizations are used to show that the various versions of pluralistic ignorance are all consistent, thus there is nothing in the phenomenon that necessarily goes against logic. Secondly, pluralistic ignorance, is on many occasions, assumed to be fragile. In this paper, however, it is shown that pluralistic ignorance need not be fragile to... (More)
- ``Pluralistic ignorance'' is a phenomenon mainly studied in social psychology. Viewed as an epistemic phenomenon, one way to define it is as a situation where ``no one believes, but everyone believes that everyone else believes''. In this paper various versions of pluralistic ignorance are formalized using epistemic/doxastic logic (based on plausibility models). The motive is twofold. Firstly, the formalizations are used to show that the various versions of pluralistic ignorance are all consistent, thus there is nothing in the phenomenon that necessarily goes against logic. Secondly, pluralistic ignorance, is on many occasions, assumed to be fragile. In this paper, however, it is shown that pluralistic ignorance need not be fragile to announcements of the agents' beliefs. Hence, to dissolve pluralistic ignorance in general, something more than announcements of the subjective views of the agents is needed. Finally, suggestions to further research are outlined. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/4017431
- author
- Hansen, Jens Ulrik LU
- publishing date
- 2012
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Future Directions for Logic: Proceedings of PhDs in Logic II
- editor
- De Vuyst, Jonas and Demey, Lorenz
- pages
- 67 - 80
- publisher
- College Publications
- ISBN
- 978-1-84890-079-0
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 4ce79f62-9fdd-4fd5-a3b5-9aba0d452464 (old id 4017431)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 10:50:31
- date last changed
- 2020-06-15 09:58:24
@inbook{4ce79f62-9fdd-4fd5-a3b5-9aba0d452464,
abstract = {{``Pluralistic ignorance'' is a phenomenon mainly studied in social psychology. Viewed as an epistemic phenomenon, one way to define it is as a situation where ``no one believes, but everyone believes that everyone else believes''. In this paper various versions of pluralistic ignorance are formalized using epistemic/doxastic logic (based on plausibility models). The motive is twofold. Firstly, the formalizations are used to show that the various versions of pluralistic ignorance are all consistent, thus there is nothing in the phenomenon that necessarily goes against logic. Secondly, pluralistic ignorance, is on many occasions, assumed to be fragile. In this paper, however, it is shown that pluralistic ignorance need not be fragile to announcements of the agents' beliefs. Hence, to dissolve pluralistic ignorance in general, something more than announcements of the subjective views of the agents is needed. Finally, suggestions to further research are outlined.}},
author = {{Hansen, Jens Ulrik}},
booktitle = {{Future Directions for Logic: Proceedings of PhDs in Logic II}},
editor = {{De Vuyst, Jonas and Demey, Lorenz}},
isbn = {{978-1-84890-079-0}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{67--80}},
publisher = {{College Publications}},
title = {{A Logic-Based Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance}},
year = {{2012}},
}