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Normative Transmission and Necessary Means

Green Werkmäster, Jakob LU (2019) In Philosophia 47(2). p.555-568
Abstract
This paper focuses on the interaction of reasons and argues that reasons for an action may transmit to the necessary means of that action. Analyzing exactly how this phenomenon may be captured by principles governing normative transmission has proved an intricate task in recent years. In this paper, I assess three formulations focusing on normative transmission and necessary means: Ought Necessity, Strong Necessity, and Weak Necessity. My focus is on responding to two of the main objections raised against normative transmission for necessary means, in that they seem to give us reasons for buying tickets to plays we have no intention of seeing and that the principles give us the wrong result when the means are necessary but not sufficient.... (More)
This paper focuses on the interaction of reasons and argues that reasons for an action may transmit to the necessary means of that action. Analyzing exactly how this phenomenon may be captured by principles governing normative transmission has proved an intricate task in recent years. In this paper, I assess three formulations focusing on normative transmission and necessary means: Ought Necessity, Strong Necessity, and Weak Necessity. My focus is on responding to two of the main objections raised against normative transmission for necessary means, in that they seem to give us reasons for buying tickets to plays we have no intention of seeing and that the principles give us the wrong result when the means are necessary but not sufficient. Even though these objections have been discussed previously, the counterarguments have so far relied on rejecting premises that the proponents of these objections are unlikely to concede. In this paper, I show how we may answer the objections in a way more likely to convince proponents of the objections. The result is an argument for a key aspect when it comes to understanding how reasons and ends-means normativity function. Normative transmission from ends to necessary means is not only interesting at the structural level, it is also possible to argue that it has implications for areas as diverse as philosophy of rationality, political philosophy and applied ethics. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Normativity, Reasons, Necessary means, Means-end normativity
in
Philosophia
volume
47
issue
2
pages
555 - 568
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:85047140325
ISSN
0048-3893
DOI
10.1007/s11406-018-9976-7
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
4de87894-0458-4a5c-829b-a5b7c4116791
date added to LUP
2019-05-23 15:17:29
date last changed
2020-01-13 01:53:46
@article{4de87894-0458-4a5c-829b-a5b7c4116791,
  abstract     = {This paper focuses on the interaction of reasons and argues that reasons for an action may transmit to the necessary means of that action. Analyzing exactly how this phenomenon may be captured by principles governing normative transmission has proved an intricate task in recent years. In this paper, I assess three formulations focusing on normative transmission and necessary means: Ought Necessity, Strong Necessity, and Weak Necessity. My focus is on responding to two of the main objections raised against normative transmission for necessary means, in that they seem to give us reasons for buying tickets to plays we have no intention of seeing and that the principles give us the wrong result when the means are necessary but not sufficient. Even though these objections have been discussed previously, the counterarguments have so far relied on rejecting premises that the proponents of these objections are unlikely to concede. In this paper, I show how we may answer the objections in a way more likely to convince proponents of the objections. The result is an argument for a key aspect when it comes to understanding how reasons and ends-means normativity function. Normative transmission from ends to necessary means is not only interesting at the structural level, it is also possible to argue that it has implications for areas as diverse as philosophy of rationality, political philosophy and applied ethics.},
  author       = {Green Werkmäster, Jakob},
  issn         = {0048-3893},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {555--568},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Philosophia},
  title        = {Normative Transmission and Necessary Means},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9976-7},
  doi          = {10.1007/s11406-018-9976-7},
  volume       = {47},
  year         = {2019},
}