Praise and Prevention
(2012) In Philosophical Explorations 15(1). p.47-61- Abstract
- I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by factors external to the agent. I conclude that even if the non-occurrence of an unwelcome outcome is ensured, the agent whose action explains this non-occurrence is praiseworthy for preventing the outcome. My examples are similar in important respects to Frankfurt-type cases. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the relationship between my... (More)
- I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by factors external to the agent. I conclude that even if the non-occurrence of an unwelcome outcome is ensured, the agent whose action explains this non-occurrence is praiseworthy for preventing the outcome. My examples are similar in important respects to Frankfurt-type cases. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the relationship between my examples and Frankfurt-type cases involving both actions and omissions. I conclude that while I may be responsible for the consequences of an action even if those consequences are unavoidable, this is not necessarily so for the consequences of omissions. (Less)
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https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/508ecb52-fff1-4c07-9024-9ceca0418cc4
- author
- Talbert, Matthew LU
- publishing date
- 2012
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Philosophical Explorations
- volume
- 15
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 47 - 61
- publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84858192005
- ISSN
- 1386-9795
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 508ecb52-fff1-4c07-9024-9ceca0418cc4
- date added to LUP
- 2019-05-30 17:56:43
- date last changed
- 2022-03-18 01:08:07
@article{508ecb52-fff1-4c07-9024-9ceca0418cc4,
abstract = {{I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by factors external to the agent. I conclude that even if the non-occurrence of an unwelcome outcome is ensured, the agent whose action explains this non-occurrence is praiseworthy for preventing the outcome. My examples are similar in important respects to Frankfurt-type cases. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the relationship between my examples and Frankfurt-type cases involving both actions and omissions. I conclude that while I may be responsible for the consequences of an action even if those consequences are unavoidable, this is not necessarily so for the consequences of omissions.}},
author = {{Talbert, Matthew}},
issn = {{1386-9795}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{47--61}},
publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}},
series = {{Philosophical Explorations}},
title = {{Praise and Prevention}},
volume = {{15}},
year = {{2012}},
}