The ontological parsimony of mereology
(2015) In Philosophical Studies 172(12). p.3253-3271- Abstract
- David Lewis (Parts of classes, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, 84) famously argued that mereology is ontologically innocent. Many who have considered this claim believe he was mistaken. Mereology is not innocent, because its acceptance entails the acceptance of sums, new objects that were not previously part of one’s ontology. This argument, the argument from ontological parsimony, has two versions: a qualitative and a quantitative one. I argue that the defender of mereology can neutralize both arguments by holding that, given mereology, a commitment to the parts of an object is not an extra ontological commitment, made in addition to the commitment to the object; and that if the parts of an object are ‘ontologically innocent’, then sums... (More)
- David Lewis (Parts of classes, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, 84) famously argued that mereology is ontologically innocent. Many who have considered this claim believe he was mistaken. Mereology is not innocent, because its acceptance entails the acceptance of sums, new objects that were not previously part of one’s ontology. This argument, the argument from ontological parsimony, has two versions: a qualitative and a quantitative one. I argue that the defender of mereology can neutralize both arguments by holding that, given mereology, a commitment to the parts of an object is not an extra ontological commitment, made in addition to the commitment to the object; and that if the parts of an object are ‘ontologically innocent’, then sums cannot fail to be innocent either. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/5148697
- author
- Smid, Jeroen LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2015
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Mereology, Parthood, Composition, Ontological Commitment, Ontological Innocence.
- in
- Philosophical Studies
- volume
- 172
- issue
- 12
- pages
- 3253 - 3271
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000364022900009
- scopus:84945485471
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11098-015-0468-3
- project
- Metaphysics and Collectivity
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- ce147147-aad8-42cd-b123-35ff0d1e5eea (old id 5148697)
- alternative location
- http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-015-0468-3
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 13:35:18
- date last changed
- 2022-04-14 01:58:57
@article{ce147147-aad8-42cd-b123-35ff0d1e5eea,
abstract = {{David Lewis (Parts of classes, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, 84) famously argued that mereology is ontologically innocent. Many who have considered this claim believe he was mistaken. Mereology is not innocent, because its acceptance entails the acceptance of sums, new objects that were not previously part of one’s ontology. This argument, the argument from ontological parsimony, has two versions: a qualitative and a quantitative one. I argue that the defender of mereology can neutralize both arguments by holding that, given mereology, a commitment to the parts of an object is not an extra ontological commitment, made in addition to the commitment to the object; and that if the parts of an object are ‘ontologically innocent’, then sums cannot fail to be innocent either.}},
author = {{Smid, Jeroen}},
issn = {{0031-8116}},
keywords = {{Mereology; Parthood; Composition; Ontological Commitment; Ontological Innocence.}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{12}},
pages = {{3253--3271}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Philosophical Studies}},
title = {{The ontological parsimony of mereology}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/3462956/5148698.pdf}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11098-015-0468-3}},
volume = {{172}},
year = {{2015}},
}